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Innovation Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential 
Creativity in Intellectual Property 
STEFAN BECHTOLD, CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN* 
All creativity and innovation build on existing ideas. Authors and inventors copy, 
adapt, improve, interpret, and refine the ideas that have come before them. The 
central task of intellectual property (IP) law is regulating this sequential innovation 
to ensure that initial creators and subsequent creators receive the appropriate sets 
of incentives. Although many scholars have applied the tools of economic analysis 
to consider whether IP law is successful in encouraging cumulative innovation, that 
work has rested on a set of untested assumptions about creators’ behavior. This 
Article reports four novel creativity experiments that begin to test those assumptions. 
In particular, we study how creators decide whether to copy, or “borrow,” from 
existing ideas or to innovate around them. 
Our data suggest that creators do not consistently behave the way that economic 
analysis assumes. Instead of rationally weighing the objective costs and benefits of 
different courses of action, creators instead were influenced by decision-making 
heuristics and individual preferences that often led to suboptimal and inefficient 
creative behavior. Many of our subjects chose to borrow when innovating was the 
optimal strategy, and even more chose to innovate when borrowing was the optimal 
strategy. We find that subjects are only mildly responsive to external incentives. 
Rather, choices between innovation and borrowing correlated much more powerfully 
with their internal, subjective beliefs about the difficulty of innovating. We conclude 
by exploring the implications of our data for innovation markets and IP doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human life is full of change. And yet there is one commonplace that is as true 
now as it was in Biblical times: “there is nothing new under the sun.”1 However 
original a new idea may seem, inevitably it is derived from previously existing ones.2 
All new authors and inventors stand on the shoulders of those who came before them. 
Their ability to do so, however, is affected by the existence of intellectual property 
(IP) rights protecting existing ideas.  
When an idea is protected by a copyright or patent, others who want to copy it, in 
whole or in substantial part, and use it for further development, evolution, and 
refinement must license the rights from their owner. Licensing is costly, and 
subsequent creators have to make decisions about whether to license existing IP 
rights or whether to create something that does not impinge upon those rights—an 
endeavor that may itself be costly when existing IP forecloses certain creative 
opportunities. In this way, IP law not only affects the pace of sequential innovation, 
but also its direction. At least at the level of theory, IP law affects innovators’ 
decisions regarding whether to build upon existing IP rights, or whether to work 
around those rights. 
This aspect of IP law3 is a vital component of the law’s aim: to optimize creative 
production by balancing incentives to current creators with access to their ideas for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Ecclesiastes 1:9. 
 2. Throughout this Article we use the term “ideas” to refer to the products of creative 
endeavor. This includes copyrightable works of authorship and patentable inventions. 
 3. In this Article we focus exclusively on copyright and patent law to the exclusion of 
trademark and trade-secret law. Also, we focus on U.S. IP law and do not consider diverging 
allocations of IP rights on sequential innovation in foreign IP regimes. 
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subsequent downstream creators. If the rights given to initial creators are too weak, 
incentives to create new ideas will likewise be insufficient. But if the rights given to 
initial creators are too strong, later development will be hindered in excess of what 
is required to sufficiently optimize first-stage creativity.  
A wealth of scholarly literature has employed the tools of law and economics 
to explore sequential innovation and the proper balance between the interests of 
initial and follow-on creators.4 This work has generally assumed that creators, 
whether first comers or followers, are rational people who act to maximize their 
individual welfare. As yet, however, almost no research focuses on how creators 
actually make decisions associated with sequential innovation.5 This Article 
describes a series of experiments doing just that. It addresses the extent to which 
innovation heuristics—mental shortcuts about innovation decisions—affect 
creators’ behavior. 
In particular, the experiments reported in this Article explore how creators decide 
whether to copy, or “borrow” from, existing ideas or to innovate around them. IP 
rights associated with existing ideas never cover the entire relevant creative field. 
There are always opportunities for others to work around existing rights in 
noninfringing ways. Which strategy is optimal—borrowing or innovating—depends 
on a number of factors including the costs of licensing the rights and the ease of 
working around those rights.  
We are interested in how creators actually make these decisions. Are they 
successful, rational judges of the costs and benefits of different options? Or are they 
prone to systematic biases that distort their decisions? The results of our experiments 
suggest that the latter is more likely the case. In particular, we find that people’s 
innovation decisions are not strongly influenced by objective assessment of the costs 
and benefits of their choices. Instead, creators’ internal beliefs and preferences about 
innovation contexts matter much more. Our data suggest the existence of innovation 
heuristics in which creators use mental shortcuts to make decisions about creativity. 
Often, but not always, these heuristics lead creators to make poor choices. Many 
creators choose to innovate even though they would be much better off borrowing, 
and many other creators choose to borrow when doing so is clearly suboptimal.  
Understanding how people choose whether to innovate or to borrow from others’ 
creativity is important; this is one of the principal decisions that IP law is intended 
to influence. Existing IP laws shape sequential innovation based on a broad 
expectation that creators will act, on balance and over time, rationally. To the extent 
that creators deviate from these expectations, IP law will be inefficient, and it will 
fail to meet whatever innovation goals we have set for it. Our experiments help 
deepen the law’s understanding of how creators select between innovation and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. See infra Part I.C. 
 5. See, e.g., Kevin J. Bourdreau & Karim Lakhani, “Open” Disclosure of Innovations, 
Incentives and Follow-On Reuse: Theory on Processes of Cumulative Innovation and a Field 
Experiment in Computational Biology, 44 RES. POL’Y 4 (2015); Julia Brüggemann, Paolo 
Crosetto, Lukas Meub & Kilian Bizer, Intellectual Property Rights Hinder Sequential 
Innovation: Experimental Evidence (Ctr. for European Governance and Econ. Dev. Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 227, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545950 
[https://perma.cc/78MC-KUGH]. 
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borrowing in the process of sequential innovation. That guidance could help the law 
better distribute resources and encourage innovation. 
Part I of this Article discusses the economic theory of sequential innovation, and 
its regulation by IP rules. The findings of four novel experiments are described in 
Part II. Then, Part III explores the implications of these findings for IP law and 
policy. 
I. REGULATING SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 
From an economic perspective, the regulation of sequential innovation is the 
central feature of intellectual property systems. When an author or inventor creates 
something new, that act often opens up multiple avenues for further creative 
development. Books can be made into movies. Pharmaceuticals can be refined for 
greater efficacy or reduced side effects. This kind of evolution, development, 
refinement, and interpretation lies at the heart of creativity and innovation—very few 
creative works of any importance spring into being fully formed in the first act that 
leads to their creation.  
IP law regulates sequential innovation in a number of ways. Copyright and patent 
laws affect who is permitted to engage in sequential innovation, how they are 
permitted to do so, and the speed with which sequential innovation takes place. In so 
doing, these laws attempt to optimize creative production by balancing incentives to 
initial creators with access to subsequent creators. How well our IP laws strike this 
balance, though, depends on whether creators respond to incentives in the ways that 
the law assumes they do. 
A. Incentives and Access in Intellectual Property Law 
In a world without IP rights, sequential innovation would be straightforward: if 
an inventor had an idea for a way to improve a smartphone, she would simply create 
the new version and sell it. Or if a filmmaker thought that a book would make a good 
movie, he could just adapt the book into a screenplay, and then hire a cast and crew 
and shoot the movie. IP law, however, sets up barriers to the reuse of pre-existing 
works by granting to initial creators certain rights in the “downstream” uses of their 
creations. The law establishes these rights to make sure that the initial creators bother 
to make their works in the first place.6 
According to the standard account of IP rights, creators require incentives to 
produce and disseminate their creations.7 The standard account views inventions and 
expressive works as costly to produce but relatively cheap to copy and disseminate.8 
In the absence of IP rights, others could simply copy new works and inventions and 
sell them at the marginal cost of reproduction.9 Because the marginal cost of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997). 
 7. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 20–21 (2003). 
 8. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004). 
 9. See id. 
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reproduction does not include the initial creator’s costs of research and development, 
she would never make any money selling works at marginal cost and would never 
bother to create in the first place.10 By prohibiting others from copying the creation, 
IP allows the creator a chance to recoup her investment by selling the work for above 
the marginal cost of reproduction.11 
But copyright and patent laws do more than prevent others from identically 
copying protected creations; they also prevent others from producing some similar 
or new versions of the protected creations. So in the example above, the author of a 
novel receives a copyright that covers exact duplication of the novel as well as 
“substantially similar” variations and other “derivative works,”12 including 
translations, sequels, and movie versions of the novel. By producing these other 
versions or by licensing the rights to others, the novelist can make more money, and, 
thus, she receives a greater incentive to invest in creating the novel in the first place.13 
While some amount of IP protection is deemed essential for creative incentives, 
too much protection can harm creativity. IP rights create a number of significant 
social costs, both static and dynamic.14 First, because owners can charge prices above 
the marginal cost of reproduction, some consumers who would have purchased the 
goods that embody the inventions and expressions at the competitive price will not 
be able to purchase at the supracompetitive price that will be charged when a 
copyright or patent creates market power.15 Economists refer to this as deadweight 
loss.16 Second, and more importantly for this Article, IP rights raise the cost of 
sequential innovation and risk creating dynamic inefficiencies.17 Because copyrights 
and patents grant some level of control to initial creators over downstream uses of 
their creations, subsequent creators will have to negotiate with them in order to 
produce and market their new creations.18 If Betty wants to make and sell her 
improved version of Alice’s patented invention, Betty and Alice will have to spend 
time and money negotiating a licensing fee. Depending on how costly these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An 
Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 281 (2014). 
 11. See id.  
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 13. According to Suzanne Scotchmer, initial creators need to be able to capture some of 
the value of sequential innovations because much of the value of the initial innovation may 
come from positive externalities associated with downstream products. That is, the social 
benefit conferred by the idea may be that it makes the creation of other ideas cheaper. If the 
initial creator cannot capture some of this surplus, she may have insufficient incentives to 
invest in creating the idea in the first place. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of 
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31 (1991). 
 14. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 996 (“Granting authors and inventors the right to exclude 
others from using their ideas necessarily limits the diffusion of those ideas, and so prevents 
people from benefiting from them.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 483, 497–98 (1996). 
 17. Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First 
Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 402 (2012). 
 18. Lemley, supra note 6, at 998. 
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negotiations are, they will, at best, increase the price of the improved goods.19 At 
worst, they will swamp the benefits that Betty could have realized from the 
improvement so that she cannot afford to make her improvement at all.20  
Copyright and patent laws must strike a balance between the incentives given to 
initial creators and the opportunities for sequential innovation reserved for 
downstream creators. If the former are too low, the orthodox model holds that 
nothing gets produced in the first place, but if they are too high, there will be 
insufficient development and evolution. The next section discusses the various 
doctrines that IP law uses to strike this balance. 
B. Regulating Sequential Innovation 
Legal doctrines about the length and breadth of copyrights and patents as well as 
laws about derivative works, the doctrine of equivalents, and fair use all regulate the 
process of innovation. The goal of these and other doctrines—and of IP systems as a 
whole—is to strike a balance between the incentives provided to initial creators and 
the opportunities left over for subsequent creators. In this sense, regulating sequential 
innovation is the principal problem of IP law. 
For a simple example of how this balancing works, consider the length of time 
that an IP right lasts. The longer the right lasts, the more money the initial inventor 
can hope to make from the invention and, thus, the greater the incentive to invest in 
the investment in the first place.21 From that point of view, it would seem like IP 
rights should last forever.22 But from the perspective of long term growth and 
innovation, longer IP rights might create problems. The existence of the IP right 
increases the costs to competitors who want to make their own newer and better 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. Id. (“[T]he existence of preexisting intellectual property rights imposes a positive cost 
on improvers that they would not otherwise face.”). 
 20. Scotchmer, supra note 13, at 32 (“If the second innovator does not get all the surplus 
being bargained over, he will earn only a fraction of the new product's market value and 
presumably only a fraction of its social value, and this fraction may be less than the cost of 
developing it. Hence the incentive for an outside firm to develop second generation products 
can be too weak.”); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1996) (“At some point, giving authors additional copyright 
protection will reduce the supply of new works because the number of marginal authors 
deterred from creating by the high cost of source material will exceed the number encouraged 
to create by the increased value of a work associated with a marginal increase in copyright 
protection.”). 
 21. Of course, discounting for the present utility, the value of a dollar made on a work a 
century from now is not likely to provide much additional incentive for a creator today. See 
Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: 
The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435, 439 (2005); 
see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1569, 1571 (2009). 
 22. The musician Sonny Bono thought so. See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Beat Should Not 
Go On: Resisting Early Calls for Further Extensions of Copyright Duration, 112 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 783, 791 n.63 (2008) (“Sonny Bono had initially favored making copyright duration 
perpetual before learning that a move by Congress to grant perpetual copyright protection 
would run afoul of the ‘limited times’ language in the Copyright Clause.”). 
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versions of the product. So the longer the right, the harder it is for newcomers to 
compete and innovate. IP law must set the duration of rights at a length that provides 
sufficient encouragement for initial creators without unduly burdening follow-on 
creators.23 
Copyright law and patent law differ greatly in the ways that they approach 
problems of sequential innovation, and these differences affect how easy it is for 
others to reuse existing ideas. In some ways, copyright law is more protective of 
sequential innovations than is patent law. For example, copyright law does not 
impose liability on defendants who have independently created the same work 
without copying the plaintiff’s work, while patent law imposes liability on all 
defendants who violate a right whether they copied from the plaintiff’s invention or 
not.24 Accordingly, if a new creator happens to hit independently upon a great idea 
that is covered by an existing copyright, the new creator is free to use it.25 Copyright 
law is also limited by its central doctrine distinguishing between original creative 
expression, which can be copyrighted, and unprotectable ideas.26 This means that 
some kinds of creativity are simply ineligible for copyright protection because they 
are so essential to later creators.27 Finally, copyright does allow some “fair uses” to 
be made of copyrighted works, which preserves some (uncertain and 
context-specific) innovation space for follow-on creativity.28 No similar limitations 
to the rights of the original inventor exist in patent law.29 
In other ways, however, copyright law grants a smaller share of the value from 
potential sequential innovation to the downstream creator than does patent law. 
First, patent law provides relatively short terms (twenty years from the filing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. However, William Landes and Richard Posner have argued for copyright protection 
that could be renewed indefinitely, in order to address congestion externalities and address 
incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting copyrighted works. William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003). 
 24. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 
525–33 (2004).  
 25. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d. Cir. 1936) (“[I]f 
by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian 
Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, 
though they might of course copy Keats’s.”). 
 26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
 27. Patent employs its own limitations designed to screen out essential building blocks of 
invention, such as the proscription against patenting laws of nature and products of nature. See 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (ruling on the 
patentability of laws of nature); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (ruling on the patentability of products of nature). 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The existence of the fair-use doctrine considerably broadens 
the scope for some kinds of follow-on creativity, especially when the creativity engages in 
criticism, parody, or transformation of the existing work.  
 29. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (advocating for fair-use-like rights for reverse 
engineering in patent law). 
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date),30 while copyright law provides incredibly long terms (often for the life of 
the author plus an additional seventy years).31 This means that sequential 
innovators will be able to build on patented inventions much more rapidly than on 
copyrighted works.  
More importantly, though, the scope of the rights with respect to sequential 
innovation differ between copyright and patent law. An author of a copyrighted work 
obtains the exclusive right not just to make and distribute literal copies of the work 
but also to create a wide range of other similar works. Thus, nonliteral but still 
“substantially similar” copies violate the owner’s rights.32 Even more broadly, the 
copyright owner obtains the exclusive rights to all actual or potential “derivative 
works” that arise from the copyrighted work, including all sequels, translations, 
recreations, and most other changes.33 If someone writes a sequel to the Rocky 
movies, for example, the writer cannot obtain any rights in her sequel and is subject 
to a copyright lawsuit from Sylvester Stallone.34 Accordingly, the would-be improver 
is effectively prevented from engaging in creating a new work until she has obtained 
the original copyright owner’s permission. 
By contrast, when it comes to the scope of rights and the ownership of follow-on 
innovation, patent law is much more responsive to downstream creators. First, patent 
law’s counterpart to the derivative-works right, known as the doctrine of equivalents, 
protects a narrower range of nonidentical creations. Just as the scope of a copyright 
includes all works that are “substantially similar” to it, the scope of a patent extends 
to other inventions that are “insubstantially different” from it.35 Despite the linguistic 
similarity of these standards,36 patent’s doctrine of equivalents gives patent owners 
a much narrower degree of control over variations on their work relative to 
copyright’s rules regarding derivative works. Indeed, in recent years patent law’s 
doctrine of equivalents has been narrowed substantially.37 Moreover, when the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). This is the case for standard human authors. In the case of 
an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright endures 
for a term of ninety-five years from the year of its first publication or a term of 120 years from 
the year of its creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012).  
 32. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that 
copyright law may not allow “plagiarist[s] [to] escape by immaterial variations”). The 
substantial similarity doctrine can extend protection to the work’s plot, structure, characters, 
and “total concept and feel.” Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 
(9th Cir. 1970); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1016. 
 33. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 34. See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 
25, 1989) (dismissing the lawsuit of an author who wrote an authorized script for a new Rocky 
movie filed against Stallone for using aspects of the script in his own sequel). 
 35. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521–22 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 36. See Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent 
Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 703–06 (1989) 
(discussing the differences between copyright’s substantial similarity doctrine and patent’s 
doctrine of equivalents). 
 37. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007) (demonstrating that the introduction of 
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downstream innovator’s invention marks a sufficiently great improvement over the 
original patent, although still technically infringing it, the “reverse doctrine of 
equivalents” kicks in to vitiate liability.38 
Most importantly, patent law allows follow-on creators to obtain IP rights in new 
improvements that use and borrow from, and thus infringe, protected inventions.39 
For example, if an inventor thinks of a way to improve the fuel economy of an 
existing, patent-protected engine, the inventor can obtain a separate patent on the 
improvement. The improver cannot make the improvement without infringing or 
licensing the original patent. And while the original inventor can keep making the 
original engine, he cannot incorporate the improvement without licensing it from the 
second inventor. The existence of these “blocking patents” means that both the initial 
inventor and the follow-on inventor must negotiate to produce the improved 
product.40 This system of blocking patents gives both parties incentive to 
successfully complete negotiations if there is money to be made from the improved 
product. 
For these reasons, and especially the last one, patent law is generally (but not 
inevitably) more supportive of follow-on innovators than copyright law is.41 
Would-be secondary inventors tend to face fewer challenges to sequential innovation 
than do would-be secondary authors. Why are the rules for improvements different 
in patent versus copyright? And do these doctrines efficiently balance rights between 
the two groups of creators? 
                                                                                                                 
 
Markman claim construction hearings was associated with a substantial decline in the 
application of doctrine of equivalents). 
 38. According to the Supreme Court: 
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the 
latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, 
literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little 
subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a 
statute has to be convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit 
and intent. 
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898). 
 39. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1008–09. 
 40. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 860 (1990) (“Two patents are said to block each other when 
one patentee has a broad patent on an invention and another has a narrower patent on some 
improved feature of that invention.”). 
 41. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1029. He writes: 
Comparing the treatment of improvers under patent and copyright law 
leads to a rather surprising result: copyright law is significantly more hostile 
to improvements than is patent law. What is surprising is not so much that the 
rules differ, but the way in which they differ. Copyright is traditionally 
thought to afford weaker, not stronger, protection than patent law, in part to 
compensate for the fact that copyrights are so much easier to obtain than 
patents and last so much longer. But in the context of improvements, the 
opposite result obtains. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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C. The Economics of Sequential Innovation 
The economic rationales for these doctrines have been richly studied. These 
rationales include the benefits of having a single party direct investment in a 
resource, the likelihood that the initial creator or a secondary creator will produce 
valuable improvements, and the possibility of reducing duplicative and wasteful 
research. Numerous authors have assessed the different incentive effects of the patent 
and copyright systems’ approaches to sequential innovation, often coming to 
different conclusions.42  
Edmund Kitch first addressed the economics of sequential innovation in 1977.43 
Kitch analogized inventions (his sole focus) to a mineral claim,44 and, accordingly, 
he emphasized the public-goods nature of technological information. In the 
absence of patent rights, the knowledge embodied in an invention could be easily 
shared with others without the inventor’s consent. In Kitch’s view, this would lead, 
inevitably, to an inefficient use of the invention in the same way that commonly 
owned property, like a mine, pasture, or lake, would be inefficiently used. Acting 
selfishly, others would try to use the invention quickly and for personal profit 
without thought to its long-term value and sustainability.45 IP rights solve this 
tragedy of the commons, according to Kitch, by naming a manager of the invention 
and protecting his ability to efficiently use the invention.46 Now, instead of 
allowing wasteful competing uses of an invention (such as when two competing 
firms attempt to develop improvements of the invention), the owner of the patent 
can direct and coordinate investments in sequential innovation in ways that will 
maximize the invention’s value.47  
As Mark Lemley points out,48 although Kitch’s analysis focused on patents, its 
structure is most similar to current copyright doctrine.49 Consider its application to 
the author of a children’s story. In the absence of copyright protection for derivative 
works, once the story is published and deemed successful, others will quickly race 
to capitalize on its value. Various authors might begin publishing sequels of the story, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 108–15, 316–20; Lemley, supra note 6, at 
1029–42; Merges & Nelson, supra note 40, at 843–44; Scotchmer, supra note 13, at 30–32; 
Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 702–06 (2014); see 
also Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work 
Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505 (2013). 
 43. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265 (1977). 
 44. Id. at 266. 
 45. Id. at 273–74. 
 46. Id. at 276 (“No one is likely to make significant investments searching for ways to 
increase the commercial value of a patent unless he has made previous arrangements with the 
owner of the patent. This puts the patent owner in a position to coordinate the search for 
technological and market enhancement of the patent's value so that duplicative investments 
are not made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.”). 
 47. Id. (“[T]he patent owner has an incentive to make investments to maximize the value 
of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable 
information appropriable by competitors.”). 
 48. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1014. 
 49. See supra note 32. 
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while other companies compete to get a movie version into theaters the quickest. Still 
others may make toys and clothing using the story’s characters. All of this investment 
in design, development, and marketing is potentially wasteful. The world may not 
need any movie versions of the story, never mind three of them. Moreover, a rational 
movie studio, knowing the kind of competition it will likely face from others, may 
simply abandon the project altogether. According to Kitch, by giving a single entity 
ownership over the whole field of derivative works, IP law prevents both the 
wastefulness and the lack of incentives. Coordinated investment in ideas is better 
than rivalrous investment.50 
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson were among the first to critique Kitch’s 
theory of sequential innovation.51 Where Kitch saw competitive investment in 
potential improvements as wasteful, Merges and Nelson viewed it as a spur to 
creativity. They worried that granting a large IP prospect right to a creator might 
lead to inactivity and underinvestment as the original creator rested on its laurels.52 
In addition, Merges and Nelson were skeptical that a single owner of a broad right 
would efficiently manage the various and unpredictable improvements that the idea 
might spawn.53 Although the firm that invents a technology had one good idea, 
there is little reason to think that it will have the second, third, or fourth good idea. 
Merges and Nelson thus favor a distributed approach to innovation that allows for 
many minds to tackle the possibilities created by a new idea.54 While Kitch’s 
prospecting inventor could certainly license all of these opportunities to others, in 
Merges and Nelson’s account, the transaction costs of doing so would likely 
swamp the expected gains.55 
Mark Lemley has also engaged in systematic analysis of IP improvement 
doctrines, and he too rejects the strong property rights approach favored by Kitch.56 
Lemley shares the concern that initial creators are not necessarily going to be the 
ones with the best ideas for improvement,57 and he points out that it will be difficult 
for the optimal improvers to make themselves known to the owner of a broad IP right 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 40, at 872. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. They explain, 
For one thing, under rivalrous competition in invention and innovation there 
is a stick as well as a carrot. Block rivalry and one blocks or greatly diminishes 
the threatened costs of inaction. Kitch assumes a model of individual or firm 
behavior where if an action is profitable it will be taken, regardless of whether 
inaction would still allow the firm to meet its desired (but suboptimal) 
performance goals. 
Id. 
 53. Id. at 873. 
 54. Id. Because no one knows for sure what is likely to work, they argue, “[t]he only way 
to find out what works and what does not is to let a variety of minds try.” Id.  
 55. Merges and Nelson support this contention by claiming that there is little evidence of 
this kind of large scale licensing of IP rights to others. Id. at 874–75. For recent empirical 
evidence, see Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean 
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137 (2015). 
 56. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1044. 
 57. Id. at 1048. 
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due to information-disclosure problems.58 Lemley adds to the list of objections to 
Kitch’s scheme concerns about transaction costs,59 uncertainty,60 externalities,61 
strategic behavior,62 and noneconomic incentives.63 Ultimately, he proposes that 
copyright law should adopt a system that incorporates some aspects of blocking 
patents by altering its derivative-works and fair-use doctrines.64 
These economic analyses of sequential innovation attempt to answer questions 
about the appropriate scope of IP rights and whether copyright and patent laws should 
operate under different principles. Underlying all of them is a series of, sometimes 
explicit but often implicit, assumptions. These include some normative assumptions 
about the goals of IP doctrine;65 and they also include descriptive assumptions about 
the behaviors of creators. The next section addresses these. 
D. A Behavioral Approach to Sequential Innovation 
 Although the topic of sequential innovation has received sustained attention from 
theoretically oriented law and economics scholarship, the behavioral factors that 
might affect how innovators respond to the ways that legal regimes structure 
incentives have hardly been studied. The economic approaches that exist in the 
literature have generally assumed that innovators are rational actors who more or less 
accurately weigh the costs and benefits of behavior and respond predictably to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. This is the problem known as Arrow’s information paradox. See Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND 
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–16 (1962). If 
a would-be improver cannot obtain property rights in the possible improvement, he cannot 
communicate to the patent owner without immediately rendering it valueless. If it is a good 
idea, the patent owner can simply usurp it for himself. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1051. 
 59. Id. at 1054–55. He writes:  
The presence of these costs in intellectual property licensing transactions 
leads to two types of first-order deviations from the efficient behavior predicted 
by economic models that do not account for transaction costs. First, some 
original inventors will inefficiently choose not to license potential improvers for 
their technology. This may happen either because the perceived value of 
the improvements is sufficiently small that it is overwhelmed by the transaction 
costs of licensing, or because the marginal value of having a third party (rather 
than the original inventor) develop the improvements does not outweigh the 
transaction costs of licensing. Second, some potential improvers who would seek 
a license for their improvements will no longer do so because of transaction 
costs. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 60. Id. at 1055–56. 
 61. Id. at 1056–58. 
 62. Id. at 1058–59. 
 63. Id. at 1059–60. 
 64. See id. at 1073. 
 65. For example, is the goal faster progress towards a single optimal solution or slower 
development towards multiple optima? We discuss this issue infra note 177. 
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options provided.66 Recent empirical research in the social sciences,67 and even 
specific work in IP scholarship,68 has questioned this assumption.  
1. Deciding To Innovate or Borrow 
This Article begins to apply the insights of the behavioral literature to some 
questions of sequential innovation. We begin with one of the principal decisions at 
the heart of sequential innovation: whether the follow-on creator should borrow from 
the existing creations or strike out and create something new. Of course, to a greater 
or lesser extent, all new creations borrow from already-existing works.69 When the 
existing works are protected by IP rights, however, the secondary creator must decide 
whether to borrow from (and thus, usually, license) the existing works or whether to 
avoid the scope of the IP rights by creating something sufficiently different from the 
existing works. The specific question we are interested in, then, is how creators 
decide whether to license existing IP rights or to “invent around” that IP by creating 
something that does not infringe the patent or copyright. For the remainder of this 
paper, we will refer to licensing IP as “borrowing” and inventing around IP as 
“innovating.”70 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 6, at 994 (“In a private market economy, individuals 
will not invest in invention or creation unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the 
cost of doing so—that is, unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the 
endeavor.”). 
 67. See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1729 (1998); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & 
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from 
Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect 
and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); see also Richard Thaler, Toward a 
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 45 (1980) (showing that 
people respond differently to a situation referred to as a “cash discount” than to an identical 
one labeled a “credit card surcharge”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of 
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981) (showing that people’s 
preferences for an identical situation change depending on whether people imagine saving 
lives or allowing people to die). 
 68. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 31, 36–39 (2011) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, The Creativity Effect]; 
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An 
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2010); Christoph Engel & Michael 
Kurschilgen, Fairness Ex Ante and Ex Post: Experimentally Testing Ex Post Judicial 
Intervention into Blockbuster Deals, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 682 (2011); Christopher Jon 
Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco & Zachary Burns, What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental 
Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1405–20 
(2013); Stefan Bechtold & Christoph Engel, The Price of Moral Rights: A Field Study (2015) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors). 
 69. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 87 (2012) (“[T]he well-known history of both classical and 
contemporary art forms illustrates the centrality of copying within creative practice.”). 
 70. In some respects, this borrow/innovate decision bears strong parallels with the 
make/buy decision that animates theory-of-the-firm analysis. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of 
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Borrowing and innovating are both important aspects of creativity. Although 
narratives of creativity stress “eureka” moments and pioneering achievements that 
seem wholly original, these stories do not accurately capture the creative process.71 
But more than just being descriptively inaccurate, this strict preference for novelty 
and innovation is also normatively unjustified. Extreme innovations are not always 
publicly valued.72 And, more importantly, in many situations innovation is socially 
costly. Although creating around existing ideas may produce new ones, these new 
ideas may not be better ones.73 And the costs in terms of time, research, and 
experimentation that are necessary to produce innovations may vastly exceed the 
price of a license to borrow from existing ideas. In these cases, borrowing is the 
optimal strategy. Sometimes it is better to take the road less traveled and other times 
it is better to stand on the shoulders of giants.74 Therefore, it is important to know 
whether creators are choosing accurately between innovating and borrowing in 
different creative contexts—and whether the law is affecting that choice for better, 
for worse, or at all. 
According to rational choice theory, a would-be creator faced with this 
borrow/innovate decision should compare the costs and benefits of borrowing with 
the costs and benefits of innovating. Borrowing entails a variety of costs, including, 
primarily, licensing fees and transaction costs. Innovating, on the other hand, may 
involve substantial investments in research and experimentation that borrowing does 
not. Secondary creators must make tradeoffs between the respective costs of 
licensing fees versus research and development. Thus, if the costs of borrowing 
increase, all else equal, creators should be more likely to innovate. 
In addition, because innovation always involves uncertainty, would-be innovators 
must consider the extent to which innovation may even be possible.75 Sometimes 
developing a new idea that does not infringe the rights of existing ideas will be easy, 
but other times it will be incredibly difficult. Prior to experimenting, though, it can 
be incredibly difficult to figure out which situation pertains. We can think of the 
difficulty of innovating in terms of the proportion of the total “innovation space” that 
                                                                                                                 
 
the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). We have begun work on an article that spells out these 
insights in more detail. 
 71. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015) (describing the responses of interviews with dozens of 
creators about the processes and motivators of creativity). 
 72. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1441, 1479 (2010) (“In the arts, while the newness component of creativity is valued in our 
individualist culture, for typical audience members and in most artistic contexts—as explained 
herein—it is important that artists not stray too far from accepted conventions, a concern that 
is not present in scientific and engineering invention.”). 
 73. It is for this reason that we prefer to focus on “creating around” rather than on 
“improvements,” as some scholars do. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1351–58 (2015) (describing various scholars’ views regarding 
improvements and inventing around and/or creating around). 
 74. To seriously mix metaphors. 
 75. Merges and Nelson explain, “In [Kitch’s] models the ‘fish’ or the ‘minerals’ are out 
there and known (with perhaps some uncertainty) to all parties. But with the technological 
‘prospects,’ and perhaps even real life mineral prospects, no one knows for sure what possible 
inventions are in the technological pool.” Merges & Nelson, supra note 40, at 873. 
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the existing IP-protected ideas cover.76 In an emerging field, innovating may be 
relatively easy compared to a mature field where it is much harder to produce new 
work. For example, coming up with an improvement in the field of grand piano 
technology is hard these days, as most of the technological advances for this 
instrument were made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.77 Compare this 
to the relative ease of coming up with the new instrument of the 
electroencephalophone, which uses brain waves to generate sounds.78 Accordingly, 
the more innovation space that remains free to explore, the more likely follow-on 
creators should be to innovate rather than borrow. 
2. Biases in Rational Decision Making 
An immense body of empirical research demonstrates that people often deviate 
from the predictions of rational-choice theory when engaged in uncertain decision 
making.79 People overweight some probabilities and underweight others.80 They 
respond differently to situations that are identical except for slight differences in 
framing.81 And they are sensitive to extraneous information that should not affect 
their decisions.82 We are interested in the extent to which similar issues arise with 
respect to creators’ innovate/borrow decisions. 
In particular, we are interested in the role that heuristic decision making may play 
in creators’ behavior. Making complex decisions about whether to borrow existing 
ideas or create around them involves compiling and assessing a variety of different 
information. As we described above, creators must compare the costs of innovating 
with the ease of doing so. Behavioral science research has consistently shown that 
when people are forced to make difficult decisions, they often simplify the task by 
substituting easy questions for hard ones. This is known as heuristic decision 
making.83 For example, when asked which is more likely, a word that starts with the 
letter K or a word that has K as its third letter, people find it easier to think of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. Merges and Nelson refer to this as the “patent breadth” that a given IP right covers. 
Ideas with lots of possible avenues for development are broad prospects, while those with few 
avenues are narrow. Merges & Nelson, supra note 40, at 880–908. 
 77. Keith T. Comparetto, The Piano in History: A “Clever Bundle of Inventions”, 
ALLEGRO PIANO PAGES, www.allegropianoworks.com/piano_history.htm [https://perma.cc
/EA9C-KYQD] (“By [1900], the instrument had reached such a degree of perfection that no 
major change has occurred since.”). 
 78. Thomas R. Henry, Invention Locates Hurt Brain Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1943, 
at 21. 
 79. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (surveying this research). 
For applications of this research to the law, see Jolls et al., supra note 67. 
 80. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979). 
 81. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
 82. Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why 
the Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311 (2006) (noting that people’s judgments 
of numerical quantities are biased by recent but unrelated numerical information). 
 83. KAHNEMAN, supra note 79, at 97–98. 
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former than the latter, so they tend to say that a word that starts with the letter K is 
more probable. In fact, it is less likely.84 
Sometimes, as in the above example, heuristics lead to substantial errors. In other 
cases, however, heuristics do very well and save on cognitive resources.85 Often, the 
success of the heuristic depends on how well it is adapted to the situation. If the 
information that is ignored by the heuristic is relatively unimportant, people may 
make as good or even better decisions than do those using more traditionally 
“rational” processes.86 If the ignored information is key to a decision, however, 
people employing heuristics may perform very poorly. For example, heuristic 
decision making can lead people to treat identical values as highly different and also 
to treat very different values as identical. People often treat the same number of 
deaths from disease differently when those deaths are referred to in the context of 
“lives saved” rather than simply as “deaths.”87 And, on the contrary, people are often 
willing to pay the same amount of money to save 2000, 20,000, or 200,000 birds.88 
When people are asked to solve complicated problems, their brains often substitute 
easier problems instead. 
Given the complexity of innovate/borrow decisions, we anticipate that people are 
likely to approach them heuristically. We expect that people may ignore important 
information about the decision-making context, and that this ignorance may affect 
the quality of the decisions that they make. 
Our experiments model two features of sequential innovation decision making: 
variations in the cost of borrowing and variations in the scope of innovation. They 
allow us to test the assumptions that underlie the economic theories discussed above 
and to study whether heuristics influence creators’ innovation behavior. We ask (1) 
to what extent are creators’ innovate/borrow decisions sensitive to the costs of 
borrowing IP; and (2) to what extent are creators’ innovate/borrow decisions 
sensitive to the scope of the available solution space. To test the hypotheses 
generated by the rational choice account, we have designed a series of experiments 
in which subjects are randomly assigned to conditions that differ according to the 
costs of borrowing and according to the available solution space. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 211 (1973). 
 85. See GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & ABC RESEARCH GRP., SIMPLE HEURISTICS 
THAT MAKE US SMART (1999). For example, physicians using the correct heuristic do a better 
job of treating patients with heart conditions than do those who attempt to assess a wide range 
of factors. For an excellent treatment of the relationship between the “heuristics and biases 
school” and the “fast and frugal school” of heuristics scholarship see MARK KELMAN, THE 
HEURISTICS DEBATE (2011). 
 86. GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2008) 
(discussing situations in which heuristics work well). 
 87. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 67, at 453. In this study, subjects vastly preferred 
a medical treatment when it was described as saving people’s lives compared to an otherwise 
identical treatment when it was described as the number of people who would die. 
 88. William H. Desvousges, F. Reed Johnson, Richard W. Dunford, Sara P. Hudson, K. 
Nicole Wilson & Kevin J. Boyle, Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent 
Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 91, 94 (1993). This behavior is often known as “scope neglect.” 
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II. EXPERIMENTS ON SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 
We ran a series of experiments designed to understand how people innovate 
subject to constraints on their choices. This Part describes those experiments and 
their results. 
A. Experiments 1 and 2: Sensitivity to the Costs of  
Borrowing and Innovating 
Our first two experiments explore the extent to which creators are sensitive to 
the costs associated with borrowing from existing IP. Existing rights impose 
constraints on creators’ ability to solve problems, and they should be willing to pay 
some amount of money to license existing rights to ease those constraints. Here, 
we are interested in understanding how creators respond to changes in the costs of 
borrowing from existing rights. 
1. Experiment 1: Design 
Our first experiment involved a computer-based creativity game derived from a 
type of combinatorial optimization math problem known as a “knapsack problem.” 
Subjects were told to imagine that they were traders in the Old West.89 Their goal 
was to fill their covered wagons with a selection of goods that had maximal value 
but that did not exceed the wagon’s weight limit.90 Subjects were told of the 
wagon’s weight limit, then they were shown twelve items that may be placed in 
the wagon. Each item had a dollar value and a weight. Subjects were given a time 
limit (ninety seconds in each of these experiments) in which to play the game. The 
game was scored based on the percentage of the maximum possible wagon value 
(that is, if the maximum value of a wagon is $100 and a subject’s solution is worth 
$80, the subject receives eighty points). Solutions that exceed the weight of the 
wagon received zero points. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. We hoped that some subjects might recall the Oregon Trail computer game of the 
1990s and treat our game similarly. 
 90. We have used a similar version of this game in a recent paper. Christopher 
Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher Jon Sprigman, 
Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 1921, 1949–50 (2014). To our knowledge, the first application of a knapsack 
problem to innovation research was in Debrah Meloso, Jernej Copic & Peter 
Bossaerts, Promoting Intellectual Discovery: Patents Versus Markets, 323 SCIENCE 
1335 (2009). 
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Figure 1. Practice Screen 
 
Subjects were first given a simple version of the game (see Figure 1) as practice 
to familiarize themselves with the task. This session was untimed and unpaid. In the 
live game, subjects were given ninety seconds to find a solution to a significantly 
harder problem. This time period is generally too short to allow subjects to calculate 
the correct answer.91 Instead, they must rely on heuristics to reach an answer. This 
kind of heuristic problem solving is similar to the kinds of innovation that take place 
in a number of fields, including computer science, biology, and engineering. 
For our first experiment, we studied how people responded to variations in the 
costs of innovating and borrowing. As we described above, borrowing from existing 
creations is typically costly because those creations are covered by IP rights that must 
be licensed. Accordingly, as the cost of borrowing increases, we would expect that 
the rate of innovation will also increase, all else being equal. This experiment 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. Knapsack problems are NP-hard problems that are hard to solve mathematically. NP 
problems are problems for which a polynomial time verification algorithm exists. See HANS 
KELLERER, ULRICH PFERSCHY & DAVID PISINGER, KNAPSACK PROBLEMS 486–87 (2004). 
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manipulates the costs of innovating and borrowing in order to assess subjects’ 
sensitivity to costs. 
After the practice round but before they played the live game, subjects were told 
that another subject had already played the game. Subjects were told that they would 
be shown the other player’s submission and that the subject’s payouts would be based 
on how many items from the other player’s submission they chose to use in their 
submission. Subjects would receive a bonus for innovating—in this case, using two 
or fewer of the items from the other player’s submission. They were told that their 
score would be calculated as indicated in Table 1. 
Table 1. Experiment 1 score calculation 
Use three or more items: Use two or fewer items: 
SS SS + X 
SS indicates the subject’s “submission score” as described above (percentage of 
maximum score). X is the size of the bonus for innovating. Subjects were not told about 
the quality of the given submission, but they could attempt to estimate it during gameplay. 
We ran six different conditions in which X equaled 1, 8, 16, 32, 58, and 72 
additional bonus points for innovating. This method allowed us to determine the 
implicit value that subjects placed on borrowing versus innovating. In the standard 
sequential innovation setting, borrowing comes with the cost of a license fee. Here, 
instead of charging a fee to borrow, we paid subjects a bonus to innovate.92 The payout 
structure can be viewed as an offer to the subject to innovate: Are you willing to take 
X additional points in order to innovate instead of borrow? As the size of the bonus 
increases, the percentage of subjects choosing to innovate should also increase. 
We were able to estimate a rational indifference range (albeit not a single 
indifference point) between borrowing and innovating by comparing the value of the 
available solutions that borrow to the value of the available solutions that do not 
borrow.93 The range at which rational subjects should be indifferent between 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. In theory, paying subjects to innovate should have similar incentive effects, although 
the behavioral science research suggests that it may have different practical effects. Prospect 
theory predicts that people will treat potential losses as more serious than they will treat 
equivalent sized potential gains. This perception might affect the value that they implicitly 
give the opportunity to innovate or borrow. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 81; 
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 80. 
 93. In our experiment, 442 solutions led to a higher knapsack weight than the solution 
provided to our subjects. If subjects decided to borrow, all of these solutions were available to 
them; if subjects decided to innovate, only some of these solutions were available. As it was 
impossible to identify these solutions in the given time frame and calculate their values, 
subjects had to employ search heuristics. The precise indifference point between borrowing 
and innovating depends on the assumptions employed regarding a rational subject’s search 
strategy and heuristics. Possible heuristics include, among others, using items that have the 
highest weight; using items that have the highest ratio of value over weight; focusing on a random 
subset of potential solutions and selecting the best from this subset; or searching for an almost 
optimal solution instead of a perfect solution. For an in-depth treatment of approximation 
algorithms to knapsack problems, see KELLERER ET AL., supra note 91, at 29–42, 161–83. In 
general, subjects who are better at the game should be willing to accept less to innovate than 
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innovating and borrowing should fall between ten to twenty additional points for 
innovating.94 Accordingly, we expected that very few subjects would be willing to 
innovate for only one bonus point and that almost all subjects would innovate when 
offered fifty-eight or seventy-two bonus points. In addition, we expected innovation 
rates would be about 50% for conditions close to the indifference point. 
Figure 2. Expected results: predicted percentage innovating 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
subjects who are not as good at the game. 
 94. Among the various search heuristics that a rational subject could employ (see supra 
note 93), we considered a handful of different approaches to determine indifference points. 
Thus, we calculated the indifference points 1) for hypothetical subjects identifying the entire 
solution space available to them if they decided to innovate or borrow, then randomly picking 
twenty solutions from this space, choosing the best among these solutions for innovating and 
borrowing, and then comparing their values (indifference point: 18.69); 2) for hypothetical 
subjects identifying all solutions with the highest possible number of items, randomly picking 
one solution for innovating and one solution for borrowing from this solution space, and 
comparing their values (indifference point: 11.74); 3) for hypothetical subjects identifying all 
solutions with either the highest or the second-highest possible number of items, randomly 
picking one solution for innovating and one solution for borrowing from this solution space, 
and comparing their values (indifference point: 14.94); 4) for hypothetical subjects identifying 
all solutions with either the highest or the second-highest possible number of items, randomly 
picking five solutions solution for innovating and five solutions for borrowing from this 
solution space, choosing the best one each and then comparing their values (indifference point: 
12.03); and 5) for hypothetical subjects identifying all solutions with either the highest or the 
second-highest possible number of items, randomly picking twenty solutions for innovating 
and twenty solutions for borrowing from this solution space, choosing the best one of each 
and then comparing their values (indifference point: 9.19). This is based on a calculation of 
the expected solution strengths if one reiterates the random selection processes described. The 
calculated indifference points indicate the points at which these random selection processes 
converge.  
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After the subjects played the game, they were asked two comprehension questions 
to ensure that they understood how the rules and payoffs worked. In addition, 
subjects answered a number of demographic and follow-up questions regarding their 
age, gender, education, primary language spoken, and self-perceived mathematical 
ability. Subjects were also asked a general question about their risk tolerance,95 and 
they completed a fifty-item personality inventory based on the “Big Five” theory of 
personality.96 
2. Experiment 1: Results 
Using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), we recruited subjects to participate in 
the experiment on creativity.97 Subjects were paid $0.50 as a show-up fee, and they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. Subjects were asked: “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks 
or do you try to avoid taking risks?” 
 96. We used a fifty-item questionnaire from the International Personality Item Pool. 
INT’L PERSONALITY ITEM POOL, http://ipip.ori.org [https://perma.cc/6LYL-3WAP]. The 
precise questions were adapted from Ruth Maria Stock, Eric von Hippel & Lennart N. 
Schnarr, Impacts of Personality Traits on Consumer Innovation Success (July 16, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2467152 [https://perma.cc
/E224-R3F7]. See generally Lewis R. Goldberg, The Structure of Phenotypic Personality 
Traits, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 26 (1993) (describing the history of the Big Five theory of 
personality). 
 97. Subjects were recruited to participate in a study on creativity. There is an extensive 
debate about how subjects recruited through AMT compare to traditional laboratory 
experiments or other population. Some of that literature is cited below in this footnote. As 
we discuss in Part III.C, however, we believe there are good reasons for using AMT in a 
study like ours. For example, many of the criticisms of AMT relate to its representativeness 
with respect to the U.S. population. The phenomena we are studying—creativity 
behaviors—are carried out largely by people who resemble the AMT population, that is, 
the young and technologically savvy. See Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel 
S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351 (2012) (showing that AMT subject pools are often 
more representative of the U.S. population than in-person convenience samples, but less 
representative than subjects in Internet-based panels or national probability samples); 
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivikins, Siddharth Suri & Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, 
Incentivizing High Quality Crowdwork, 24 INT’L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB 419 (2015), 
available at http://www.www2015.it/documents/proceedings/proceedings/p419.pdf 
(showing how performance-based payments improve quality of AMT participant 
responses); John J. Horton, David G. Rand & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Online 
Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 
399 (2011) (showing similar internal and external validity of online experiments, compared 
to laboratory and field experiments); Yanna Krupnikov & Adam Seth Levine, 
Cross-Sample Comparisons and External Validity, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL POL. SCI. 59 (2014) 
(showing that AMT subjects behave differently than student and adult samples); Richard 
N. Landers & Tara S. Behrend, An Inconvenient Truth: Arbitrary Distinctions Between 
Organizational, Mechanical Turk, and Other Convenience Samples, 8 INDUS. & 
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 142 (2015) (discussing sampling strategy in general); Leib 
Litman, Jonathan Robinson & Cheskie Rosenzweig, The Relationship Between Motivation, 
Monetary Compensation, and Data Quality Among US- and India-Based Workers on 
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were paid an additional $0.03 per point they scored in the game. The minimum 
payment was $0.50 and the maximum was $4.40. Five-hundred-ninety-eight subjects 
participated in the experiment. From this pool, we removed 10 subjects who failed 
an attention check at the end of the experiment. We also removed an additional 143 
subjects who failed either or both of the comprehension questions that tested 
subjects’ understanding of the rules and payouts. After removing another 13 subjects 
who had gone over the weight limit, this left 432 subjects, of whom 58.8% were 
male. There were no significant differences in the rates of being excluded between 
the conditions.98 
Our data present an unusual picture of subjects’ responsiveness to innovation 
incentives. Overall, 68.06% of the subjects chose to innovate rather than borrow. 
Surprisingly, however, we see almost no evidence of sensitivity to the magnitude of 
the offered innovation bonus. Innovation rates for the subjects offered only one 
additional bonus point were somewhat lower than for those offered eight additional 
bonus points, but we see no significant differences in rates of innovation between 
any of the other conditions. Substantial increases in bonuses had no meaningful 
effect on innovation rates. 
Table 2. Percentage innovating per bonus condition 
 +1 +8 +16 +32 +58 +72 
Percentage (%) innovating 58.57 70.00 71.05 71.23 71.01 66.22 
Note: +1 versus +8 condition: one-tail t-test, p = 0.079; two-tail t-test, p = 0.159.  
+1 condition v. the mean of all other conditions: two-tail t-test, p = 0.070.  
All other differences are nonsignificant. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
Mechanical Turk, 47 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 519 (2015) (discussing optimal mechanisms 
for improving data quality on AMT); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G. 
Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION 
MAKING 411, 417 (2010) (“Workers in Mechanical Turk exhibit the classic heuristics and 
biases and pay attention to directions at least as much as subjects from traditional 
sources.”); Dan Kahan, What’s a “Valid” Sample? Problems with Mechanical Turk Study 
Samples, Part 1, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 8, 2013, 9:34 AM) 
http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/8/whats-a-valid-sample-problems-with-mechanical
-turk-study-sam.html [https://perma.cc/4QU2-FAZH] (discussing the validity of study 
samples in general); Dan Kahan, Fooled Twice, Shame on Who? Problems with 
Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 2, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 10, 2013, 
9:30 AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/10/fooled-twice-shame-on-who
-problems-with-mechanical-turk-stud.html [https://perma.cc/59VN-N7B5] (discussing 
problems of the AMT subject pool in general). Replication of the experiments reported in 
this article in a social science laboratory is left to future work. 
 98. By condition, the number of subjects excluded for overweight wagons is as follows: 
+1 = 1; +8 = 4; +16 = 5; +32 = 4; +58 = 2; +72 = 1. All comparisons are nonsignificant. 
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Figure 3. Percentage innovating per bonus condition 
 
In sum, our subjects were surprisingly unmoved by alterations in the size of the 
bonus provided for innovating. Although the bonus available for innovating 
increased starkly between conditions, subjects were unresponsive to these changes. 
Their insensitivity is striking at both the low and the high ends of the scale. At the 
+1 bonus level, 58.57% of our subjects chose to innovate even though the incentive 
to do so was minimal. The other player’s submission was a good one (it scored 90% 
of the total points), so inventing around it was difficult. Faced with this difficulty, 
subjects should not have been willing to forego the opportunity to borrow in favor of 
a single point (equivalent to $0.03). Where we had expected to see little or no 
innovating, in fact, more than half of the sample chose to innovate. The inverse is 
true at the other end of the scale. Subjects in the +58 and +72 bonus conditions 
received what should have been entirely supernumerary incentives to innovate, yet 
barely more than two-thirds of subjects chose to do so. These subjects could have 
increased their payments significantly, by 50% or more. With this many bonus points 
at stake, subjects could have easily scored more by innovating, but many still decided 
not to. 
These anomalies in the extreme conditions had significant effects on the payouts 
the subjects received. The nearly 60% of subjects who chose to innovate in the +1 
condition scored significantly worse than did those who chose to borrow. And the 
subjects who chose to borrow in the +32, +58, and +72 bonus conditions received 
much smaller payouts than did those who innovated.99  
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. As with all of the previous and subsequent analyses, these exclude the players who 
entered submissions that exceeded the wagon’s weight limit. Because these players received 
zero points, entering their data into this analysis would have produced unnecessary variability. 
Players with overweight wagons did not different significantly between conditions. See supra 
note 98. 
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Table 3. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition 
 +1 +8 +16 +32 +58 +72 
Innovators 77.15*** 84.45 92.13 107.92*** 133.86*** 148.20*** 
Borrowers 89.31*** 90.43 86.41 83.95*** 89.55*** 89.44*** 
Note: The stars indicate that the mean scores of innovators and borrowers within a particular 
condition differ significantly. *** p < 0.01. All others are nonsignificant. 
Figure 4. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition 
 
Significant numbers of our subjects were leaving money on the table. Their 
innovate/borrow decisions were clearly suboptimal from the perspectives of both 
individual welfare and social welfare. The scope of the individual suboptimal 
behavior is readily apparent. Subjects who chose unwisely had significantly lower 
returns.100 We can also estimate the social loss by comparing the actual points scored 
for all players with the number of points that would have been scored had all of the 
players chosen optimally. We will assume that all of the players would have received 
the same scores as did those who chose optimally. In the +1 condition, the combined 
score of innovators and borrowers was 8218. Had all the subjects borrowed, 
however, they would have scored 8931 points, an 8.67% increase.101 In the +72 
condition, the combined score of innovators and borrowers was 12,835. But had all 
of the subjects innovated, their combined score would have been approximately 
14,820, a 15.46% increase. These differences represent estimates of the lost social 
welfare from suboptimal decision making.102 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. See supra Table 3 and Figure 4. 
 101. We arrived at these figures by adding the points scored by innovators with the points 
scored by borrowers. To calculate the scores if everyone had played optimally, we assigned 
the mean score of the borrowers to each of the innovators. 
 102. Creators who experience positive welfare from innovating or borrowing might offset 
89.31 90.43 86.41 83.95 89.55 89.4477.15
84.45
92.13
107.92
133.86
148.20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
+1 +8 +16 +32 +58 +72
M
ea
n 
Po
in
ts
 S
co
re
d
Borrowers Innovators
2016] INNOVATION HEURISTICS 1275 
 
Given the magnitude of these effects, it is important to ask why our subjects were 
almost entirely unaffected by the size of the bonus offered for innovating and why 
so many of them made suboptimal decisions. One possibility is that they were simply 
not paying attention or trying terribly hard, and, thus, when confronted with the 
instructions, they breezed through the game without thinking. We have a number of 
reasons for doubting that this is the case. First, we discarded a number of subjects 
who failed the comprehension or attention questions. Moreover, previous experience 
with AMT subjects suggests that they are generally well motivated to perform these 
kinds of tasks, especially when performance is linked with increased payment.103  
Most importantly, subjects were asked a follow-up question about how easy they 
thought it was to find a solution that did not borrow two or more of the items from 
the other player’s submission. Looking at Figure 5, it seems that the easier subjects 
thought innovating was, the more likely they were to innovate. 
Figure 5. Mean perceived difficulty of innovating 
 
We ran logistic regression analyses of these and other demographic and follow-up 
questions. The regression tables are reported in Appendix A. They confirm that 
                                                                                                                 
 
these estimates. Thus, for example, if creators think that it is fun and challenging to innovate 
their own solutions even when good ones already exist, their pleasure may help make up for 
the costly expenditures of resources involved in innovating. Or if creators enjoy borrowing 
even when a substantial share of the innovation space remains open, their enjoyment too could 
conceivably explain, at least in part, why many subjects chose to borrow in conditions where 
the bonuses heavily favored innovation. 
 103. See Sprigman et al., supra note 68, at 1405–11. In addition, most of our subjects took 
the full ninety seconds to play the game, and their self-reported motivation to score well was 
generally high. Over 88% of our subjects reported that they were motivated or highly 
motivated to score well. If they were not trying hard, they could simply move some items to 
the wagon and submit the game early. 
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subjects were paying attention and responding rationally to the problem presented to 
them, at least within the context of their own beliefs.104 Those subjects who were 
innovating were likely doing so because they thought it was relatively easy to do 
(whether it was or not).105 Accordingly, the decision to innovate in the +1 condition 
might have been driven by overconfidence in the subject’s ability to find a 
noninfringing solution.106 And the inverse is likely true for those who borrowed in 
the high bonus conditions. They may have been insufficiently confident of how 
easily they would be able to innovate and reap the large bonuses available.107 
A further and related possibility is that our subjects’ insensitivity to the bonus size 
suggests that there may be individual differences between people’s willingness to 
engage in innovation. Raustiala and Sprigman have discussed the differences 
between “tweakers,” who tend to make minor improvements on existing creations, 
and “pioneers,” who prefer to attempt major innovations.108 Pioneers tend to receive 
a lot of attention, because the scope of their innovations makes the value of their 
contributions seem obvious. But tweakers are important too. Their efforts refine and 
improve the initial pioneering innovation, helping to figure out the best way to 
implement it. And by altering and adapting the innovation, tweakers point out its 
flaws and prepare the ground for the next pioneer.109 
Although there have been volumes of papers published on the relationship 
between individual characteristics and creativity, as yet, we could find no research 
directed to distinguishing between the creativity of tweakers and pioneers. We 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. See infra Appendix A, Regressions 4 and 5. In all regression analyses of Experiment 
1, the ease with which subjects believed they would be able to innovate was strongly correlated 
with whether they did, in fact, innovate. Interestingly, the easier subjects thought the game 
was in general, the more likely they were to borrow rather than innovate. This makes sense: 
because innovating restricts the sample of items that can be used, it should be easier to find a 
solution when borrowing. 
 105. We cannot be sure that subjects’ beliefs were, in fact, causing their behavior because 
their beliefs were reported after they played the game. It is possible that subjects who 
innovated felt compelled to say that they found innovating easy and that subjects who 
borrowed thought they needed to say that innovating was hard in order to justify their 
behaviors. 
 106. We have seen similar kinds of overconfidence affect creators’ behavior in our earlier 
experiments. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, supra note 68, at 42 (showing 
that overconfidence in the quality of their work drives creators to assign high value to it). 
 107. One possibility is that the results of our first experiment are merely an artifact of the 
experimental design based on the subject’s perception of the source of the provided 
submission on which the subject is attempting to improve. In the real world, follow-on 
innovators receive more information about existing ideas than in our first experiment. They 
may know, for example, whether the original innovator was a very talented and bright 
individual. In such case, follow-on innovators may consider it harder to “invent around” an 
existing idea and therefore decide to borrow rather than innovate. We ran another experiment 
to test whether subjects’ decisions to innovate or borrow are influenced by the perceived 
quality of the original innovator. The design and results of this experiment are reported in 
Appendix F, infra. 
 108. KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW 
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 132–33 (2012). 
 109. Id. at 137. 
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examined responses to our follow-up questions to see if we could detect significant 
differences between the groups. In particular, we were interested in whether there are 
any specific demographic features of those people who innovated in the +1 bonus 
condition (where innovating was irrational) and those people who borrowed in the 
+58 and +72 bonus conditions (where borrowing was irrational).  
One possibility is that pioneers tend to be risk takers, while tweakers are more 
risk averse. Tweakers may be more cautious when confronted with uncertainty about 
the possibilities for innovating and, thus, prefer to borrow from and tinker with 
existing work. This hypothesis, however, is not borne out by our data. Subjects who 
reported that they were generally “fully prepared to take risks” did not innovate at 
significantly higher rates than did those who said that they “try to avoid taking 
risks.”110  
In addition, we considered whether innovation behavior was predicted by 
variation in subjects’ personality traits. According to the five-factor model of 
personality, variation along five different personality traits—openness to experience, 
extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism—explains 
individuals’ personality differences.111 In particular, we focused on openness to 
experience and extroversion, because previous studies had shown these traits to be 
positively correlated with creativity.112  
Interestingly, subjects who rated highly on openness to new experience did, in 
fact, innovate at significantly higher rates than did subjects who rated low on 
openness. In regression analysis of innovation behavior controlling for the five 
personality variables, as well as controlling for subject age and gender, higher 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. See infra Appendix A, Regression 2. Risk preference was never close to statistically 
significant in any of the regression equations that we ran.  
We used a single-item measure of risk preference taken from the following source. Thomas 
Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp & Gert G. Wagner, 
Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants, and Behavioral Consequences, 9 J. 
EUROPEAN ECON. ASS’N 522, 525 (2011). Recent research on risk preference suggests that it 
is a complex concept that may vary across domains. Id. For example, people may be willing 
to take risks with money at the betting table but unwilling to take risks with personal safety 
while driving a car. Because we included the lengthy personality inventory, we decided to use 
a smaller risk measure. Also, this research suggests that incentive-compatible techniques, 
where subjects are really engaging in risky behaviors, have better predictive value. Because 
our subjects were already engaging in one complex, risky game, we decided not to have them 
play another incentive-compatible risk game. Further research using broader risk measures 
and incentive-compatible measures is desirable.  
 111. See Paul T. Costa, Jr. & Robert R. McCrae, Four Ways Five Factors Are Basic, 13 
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 653 (1992) (discussing support for the five-factor 
model including observational studies, linguistic and cultural studies, and heritability studies). 
 112. See Sun Young Sung & Jin Nam Choi, Do Big Five Personality Factors Affect 
Individual Creativity? The Moderating Role of Extrinsic Motivation, 37 SOC. BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY 941 (2009); Stock et al., supra note 96. The fifty-item measure that we used 
included ten questions for each of the personality factors. Answers to these questions were 
used to compute factor scores using the methods described in Stock et al., supra note 96. Factor 
scores were then entered into the logistic regressions of innovation behavior reported in 
Appendix A, infra. 
1278 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:1251 
 
openness scores were correlated with increased likelihood of innovation.113 None of 
the other personality factors was significantly correlated with innovation behavior.114 
A one-point increase in openness on a scale of one to ten predicted a 32.9% increase 
in likelihood of innovating.115 
The relationship between openness to experience and innovation behavior makes 
sense. Individuals who rate highly on openness tend to have a preference for variety 
and change, and they tend to be intellectually curious. When faced with a creativity 
problem, then, it is not surprising that subjects high in openness chose to branch out 
in a new direction rather than continue down an already established path.  
Although this finding about the relationship between personality and innovation 
behavior is interesting, it is important to understand it in light of the larger context 
of our study. When we consider the relative size of the effect of openness to 
experience in explaining innovation behavior, it is much smaller than the size of the 
effect associated with subjects’ beliefs about the ease of innovating.116 So although 
the personality effect is statistically significant, it is not nearly as large as the effect 
of subjective belief. 
3. Experiment 2: Design 
In Experiment 2 we attempted a partial replication of the results of Experiment 1 
using a different creativity task. Instead of using a task based on mathematical 
creativity, we designed a game related to verbal creativity. The game is similar to the 
popular board game Scrabble, in which players attempt to compose words using a 
list of letters with varying values. Subjects were told that their goal was to use the 
letters to compose a list of six words with the highest possible value. They were paid 
$0.50 for participating and an additional $0.01 for each point their list of words 
scored. 
Our subjects were given the list of letters in figure 6. 
Figure 6. List of letters given to subjects 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. See infra Appendix A, Regression 3. 
 114. When we include in the regression analysis controls for ease of solving the game and 
ease of innovating, the correlation with openness becomes nonsignificant and the correlation 
for extroversion becomes significant, but in the opposite direction than we had predicted. 
People who score higher in extroversion are more likely to borrow than to innovate, controlling 
for these other variables. We are unsure of what to make of this finding. See infra Appendix 
A, Regression 4. 
 115. See infra Appendix A, Regression 3. 
 116. See infra Appendix A, Regressions 3 and 4. Regression 3, which only includes the 
personality factors and age and gender as variables, has a low R2 value (0.028). This suggests 
that little of the variation in innovation behavior is predicted by this model. Consider also that 
the size of the coefficient for ease of innovating is much larger than the (nonsignificant) 
coefficient for extroversion in Regression 4, which includes both. 
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As in Experiment 1, subjects were told that another subject had played the game 
before they did and entered a list of words. They were told, again, that they could 
borrow from that player’s list of words, but that if they borrowed two or fewer words, 
they would receive an additional bonus. The list of words provided by the other 
subject was as follows: 
 
zek, peak, pea, zap, key, aye117 
 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six different bonus conditions that 
were similar in magnitude to those of Experiment 1.118 They were offered +1, +5, 
+15, +35, +50, or +65 additional points if they used two or fewer of the other 
subject’s words.119 We again attempted to assess the rational indifference point for a 
player of moderate verbal ability, and we estimated that it should fall somewhere 
around +15.120 Thus, subjects who were in the +1 condition should have been 
unwilling to innovate for such a small payout given the constraint of doing so, and 
subjects in the +50 and +65 conditions should have been very willing to innovate in 
order to obtain so many additional points. 
Subjects were given ninety seconds to enter their list of words. The game was 
designed to automatically eject them from the study if they navigated off of the web 
page during the game. This does not mean that subjects were unable to cheat, but the 
short time limit should have limited opportunities to do so. 
Once again, after subjects played the game they were asked two comprehension 
questions and a series of demographic and follow-up questions. 
4. Experiment 2: Results 
Using AMT again, we recruited 707 subjects. From this pool, we removed 5 
subjects who failed an attention check at the end of the experiment. Of the remaining 
subjects, 103 opened another web page during the study and were excluded from the 
analysis, as they may have used outside help (such as Scrabble word finders) which 
could taint our analysis. We excluded another 58 subjects who failed on one or more 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. This list scored 235 points out of a highest possible 415 points. 
 118. Because subjects in Experiment 1 were paid $0.03 per point while those in Experiment 
2 were paid $0.01 per point, the conditions actually varied more in the first experiment than 
in the second. Nonetheless, our results show that subjects were more sensitive to these 
differences in the second experiment than in the first. 
 119. We decided to implement the borrowing of words and not individual letters, in order 
to make the game more tractable for our subjects.  
 120. Here, we estimated the indifference point by looking at the indifference points of three 
separate hypothetical players. A player who knew the full dictionary of available words and 
could play the best words would have been willing to innovate at any bonus higher than 0. A 
player who knew the full dictionary of available words but who played words drawn at random 
from that set would have been willing to innovate at any bonus higher than 15. And a player 
who knew only the six lowest scoring words would have been willing to innovate at any bonus 
higher than 35. 
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of our various comprehension checking questions.121 This left 541 subjects, of whom 
56% were male. 
Our results in Experiment 2 are both similar and different from those of 
Experiment 1. This time, we find that an increase in bonus size significantly increases 
the percentage of subjects who choose to innovate.122 As one would expect, the more 
money people are paid to innovate rather than borrow, the more likely they are, in 
general, to do so. 
Table 4. Percentage innovating per bonus condition 
 +1 +5 +15 +35 +50 +65 
Percentage (%) 
innovating 
36.67 
(a)(b) 
39.02 
(c) 
38.89 
(d) 
47.47 
(e) 
49.45 
(a) 
59.55 
(b)(c)(d)(e) 
(a) +1 versus +50 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.082. 
(b) +1 versus +65 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.002. 
(c) +5 versus +65 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.007. 
(d) +15 versus +65 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.005. 
(e) +35 versus +65 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.095. 
All other comparisons are nonsignificant. 
Figure 7. Percentage innovating per bonus condition 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. The excluded subjects came from the following conditions: 14 were cut from the 1 
point group; 9 were cut from the 5 point group; 7 were cut from the 15 point group; 4 were cut 
from the 35 point group; 10 were cut from the 50 point group; and 14 were cut from the 65 
point group. There were no significant differences in exclusion rates by condition. 
 122. Rather than comparing individual conditions against one another, we analyze the 
effect of bonus size in regression analyses that control for other variables as well. See infra 
Appendix C. In these regressions, bonus condition is a significant predictor of subjects’ 
innovation behavior. This was not true for Experiment 1. 
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That we found a positive relationship between innovation and bonus size in 
Experiment 2 and not in Experiment 1 is somewhat surprising because the actual 
magnitude of the differences between the conditions was smaller in the second 
experiment. In Experiment 1, each “point” was paid $0.03, while in Experiment 2, 
each “point” was paid $0.01. For some reason, though, subjects were more 
responsive to the size of the bonus here than in the prior experiment. 
Despite the positive effect of bonus size, subjects’ innovate/borrow decisions 
were, as in Experiment 1, far from what one might have predicted. Importantly, the 
results in Experiment 2 track those in Experiment 1 in that far too many subjects 
innovated at low bonus amounts, while too many subjects borrowed at high bonus 
amounts. At the +1 bonus level, 36.67% of our subjects chose to innovate even 
though the incentive to do so was minimal. Given that the other player’s solution 
already scored 56% of the total points, subjects decided to forego the opportunity 
to borrow in favor of a single point (equivalent to $0.01 in this experiment). While 
the rate of innovation was lower than in Experiment 1, we still saw more than a 
third of our subjects innovate at the +1 bonus level. And similar to Experiment 1, 
the reverse is true at the other end of the scale. Subjects in the +65 bonus condition 
had a large incentive to innovate, but still 40% of our subjects in this condition 
decided to borrow.  
As in Experiment 1, these anomalies had effects on the subjects’ payout. The 
third of our subjects who chose to innovate in the +1 bonus level condition scored 
worse than did those who chose to borrow. And borrowers in the +65 bonus level 
condition performed worse than innovators.123 Accordingly, we observed that 
subjects who chose the wrong strategy lost money relative to those who chose the 
optimal strategy. 
Table 5. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition 
 +1 +5 +15 +35 +50 +65 
Innovators 235.24*** 230.78*** 253.57*** 283.19*** 288.67 305.66 
Borrowers 284.47*** 273.54*** 286.91*** 287.88*** 286.96 283.89 
Note: The stars indicate that the mean scores of innovators and borrowers within a particular 
condition differ significantly. *** p < 0.01. All other comparisons are nonsignificant. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Interestingly, these results suggest that we may have underestimated the indifference 
point for our subjects. It was not until the +35 condition that innovators scored about as well 
as borrowers did. Our subjects apparently found coming up with their own nonborrowing 
words more difficult that we had initially predicted. Nonetheless, many of them still chose to 
innovate in the low bonus conditions. 
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Figure 8. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition 
 
In Experiment 1, the principal driver of subjects’ innovate/borrow decisions appears 
to have been their subjective belief about how easy innovating was. The easier they 
thought it was to innovate, the more likely they were to do so.124 We found the same to 
be true in Experiment 2.125 Participants who said they found it difficult to innovate tended 
to borrow from the provided solution, across all conditions. In fact, subjective beliefs 
were a much stronger predictor of innovation behavior than was bonus size. 
Figure 9. Mean perceived difficulty of innovating  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. See supra note 104. 
 125. Again, we cannot be sure about the causal effect of subjects’ beliefs. See supra note 105. 
284.47 273.54 286.91 287.88 286.96 283.89
235.24 230.78
253.57
283.19 288.67 305.66
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
+1 +8 +16 +32 +58 +72
M
ea
n 
Po
in
ts
 S
co
re
d
Borrowers Innovators
1.84
2.12
1.87 1.75
2.07
1.83
3.21
2.88
3.37 3.36
3.02 3.08
1
2
3
4
5
6
+1 +5 +15 +35 +50 +65
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
D
iff
ic
ul
ty
 
(1
 =
 m
os
t d
iff
ic
ul
t, 
6 
= 
le
as
t d
iff
ic
ul
t)
Borrowers Innovators
2016] INNOVATION HEURISTICS 1283 
 
The visual impression from both figures is confirmed by the regressions in 
Appendix C. The perceived ease of solving the game and of innovating are 
significant predictors of whether a subject chooses to innovate or not. 
Similar to Experiment 1, it seems that subjects who were innovating were doing 
so because they thought it was relatively easy to do (whether this was correct or not). 
However, none of our other follow-up or demographic questions was a significant 
predictor of behavior, including, in this experiment the personality factors.126 
5. Bringing Experiments 1 and 2 Together 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are illuminating. We interpret them as 
suggesting that creators can be modestly responsive to objective changes in the costs 
and benefits of innovating versus borrowing. Far more important, however, are 
creators’ subjective beliefs about innovation environments. What seems to matter 
most to creators’ innovate/borrow decisions is whether they believe that innovating 
will be easy or difficult. This implies that our subjects are performing in a way that 
is rationally consistent with their own beliefs, but, as these experiments show, those 
beliefs often lead to suboptimal behavior when they are not combined with other 
relevant information. 
We think that our subjects were confronting the innovate/borrow problem at the 
heart of these experiments using a heuristic based on the ease of innovating. 
Heuristics typically involve the substitution of an easier question for a harder one.127 
In these experiments the question of whether to innovate or borrow required subjects 
to think about both (1) how easy it was to come up with an innovative 
(nonborrowing) solution and (2) how valuable the innovative solution was compared 
to how valuable the borrowing solution was. Our subjects, however, seem to have 
only focused on the first of these. Thus, subjects in the low bonus conditions who 
thought it was easy to develop nonborrowing solutions chose to innovate even though 
doing so limited their options without substantial compensation. And some subjects 
in the high bonus conditions who thought it was difficult to find nonborrowing 
solutions borrowed despite the very strong inducement to play an innovating 
solution. 
The innovate/borrow decisions in our game were not particularly complex, but 
many subjects still seem to ignore relevant information that would help them make 
these decisions better. Partly, this is the result of the short time period they had to 
solve the problems. Perhaps, if they were given more time, they would have been 
able to combine all of the information necessary to optimally play the game. 
Although real-world creators typically have far more time to engage in these sorts of 
decisions, the information that they have to assess is substantially more complex. 
Given the difficulty of the decisions they face, they might be just as likely to rely on 
heuristics to solve problems as our subjects were. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. See infra Appendix C. 
 127. See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. 
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B. Experiments 3 and 4: Sensitivity to the Quality of Existing Ideas 
The previous experiments explored the extent to which subjects’ innovation 
behavior was influenced by the costs of borrowing or innovating. Our data suggest 
that the costs of borrowing played a relatively little role in their decisions to borrow 
or innovate. But these are not the only relevant factors this decision involves. 
Rational people should also consider how difficult it will be to make a new discovery 
that does not infringe upon existing ideas. We refer to this as the scope of the 
innovation space.128 When the scope of the innovation space is large, people should 
be more willing to innovate (all else equal) than when it is small, because it will be 
easier to find a noninfringing solution.  
Two variables affect the scope of the innovation space: the quality of the existing 
ideas and the strength of the IP rights protecting them.129 For example, a new 
discovery may open up an entire field of research that is only barely touched by 
existing IP rights. The early days of most fields look like this. But as the field 
matures, it will tend to be harder and harder to produce new works or inventions that 
do not overlap with existing ones. In the same way, if the breadth of the existing IP 
rights increases, such that new creators have to produce ideas with fewer similarities 
to the existing ideas, innovation will become harder, and borrowing from the existing 
ideas will be more attractive.  
The prior two experiments suggested that people were particularly sensitive to 
their own beliefs about how large the innovation space was. The easier they thought 
it would be to innovate, the more likely they were to do so. Those experiments used 
subjects’ self-reports about the scope of the innovation space. Here, in Experiments 
3 and 4, we test the extent to which subjects are responsive to changes in the 
innovation space derived from the quality of the underlying ideas by objectively 
manipulating the quality of the given solutions. 
1. Experiment 3: Design 
Experiment 3 used the same wagon-creativity task and experimental software 
program as in Experiment 1. Whereas Experiment 1 manipulated the costs and 
sources of the underlying ideas, Experiment 3 manipulated the quality of the 
underlying ideas. After going through the practice game, subjects were given the 
same instructions about the nature of the game and the distribution of points. Subjects 
were told that they would receive an additional sixteen points if their submission did 
not use three or more of the items from the existing submission.  
Then subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions based on the 
strength of the underlying submission. Depending on condition, subjects were either 
shown a submission that was 60%, 80%, or 100% of the maximum possible score. 
Subjects were not told how strong the submission was, but they should have been 
capable of making informed judgments about it.130 While the 60% solution afforded 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 130. For example, as submission strength increased, so too did the number of items used 
in the submission. 
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many valuable options that subjects could choose that did not involve borrowing, the 
100% solution offered very few, and the 80% solution was in the middle. Subjects 
then played the game, answered two comprehension questions, and answered a series 
of follow-up and demographic questions similar to those used in the previous 
studies.131  
The sixteen-point bonus offered to all subjects should fall near subjects’ rational 
indifference point in the 80% condition. In this condition, the offer of sixteen points 
for innovating produced options that were about equally good for either choice. In 
the 60% condition, though, because the innovation space was so much larger, 
subjects should tend to accept the bonus at very high rates, and we should see near 
universal innovating. On the contrary, in the 100% condition, the available 
innovation space was very small (although not zero),132 so almost all subjects should 
eschew the bonus and borrow. 
2. Experiment 3: Results 
We recruited 303 subjects via AMT to participate in the study. As with the 
previous experiments, subjects were paid $0.50 for participating and $0.03 for each 
point that they scored in the game. We excluded 62 subjects from the final data 
analysis for missing one of the comprehension questions, not being native English 
speakers, or missing an attention question. Exclusions did not differ significantly 
between the three conditions. Of the remaining population of 241 subjects, 143 
(59.34%) were male, with a mean age of 33.04 (range 19–68). 
Our results are partly consistent with our expectations and partly inconsistent with 
them. As predicted, when confronted with a smaller innovation space, subjects were 
less likely to innovate and more likely to borrow. Subjects in the 60% condition 
innovated more than those in the other conditions. Although subjects in the 80% 
condition innovated more than those in the 100% condition, we cannot say that the 
result was statistically significant. In general, then, we observe some degree of 
sensitivity to the scope of innovation space, but it is not as great as we would have 
predicted.133 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Experiment 3 did not include the fifty-item personality inventory. 
 132. In addition to the 100% solution provided to the subjects, three other 100% solutions to 
the knapsack problem exist. If a subject chooses to innovate and comes up with one of the other 
100% solutions, he will always be better off than by choosing to borrow, as he not only receives 
the payoff for the 100% solution but also the sixteen point bonus for innovating. But the likelihood 
that a subject will come up with one of three other 100% solutions is small, given that there are 
over 3000 possible solutions to the knapsack problem, whose quality ranges from 0 to 100%. 
 133. We also do not observe statistically significant differences between the mean scores 
of innovators versus borrowers: 
Table 6. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition 
 60% 80% 100% 
Innovators 94.32 90.58 88.38 
Borrowers 85.40 86.22 85.54 
All differences between innovators and borrowers within a condition are nonsignificant. 
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Table 7. Percentage innovating per condition 
 60% 80% 100% 
Percentage (%) innovating 80.77 
(a)(b) 
69.33 
(a)(c) 
60.23 
(b)(c) 
(a) 60% versus 80% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.102. 
(b) 60% versus 100% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.004. 
(c) 80% versus 100% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.231. 
Moreover, as in our previous studies, innovation rates are still unusually distributed. 
Although innovation rates were higher in the 60% condition, they did not reach the 
nearly universal level that rational choice theory would have predicted. And on the 
opposite side of the spectrum, in the 100% condition, more than half of the subjects 
still chose to innovate even though doing so was incredibly difficult. So although the 
scope of the innovation space is affecting subjects’ decisions, the magnitude of its 
effect is still relatively small.134 Again, when we look at our follow-up and 
demographic data, we can tell a richer story about innovation behavior. The changes in 
innovation rates across conditions and subjects’ within-condition innovation behavior 
are related to their perceptions of how easy they thought it was to innovate (for 
example, find a solution using 2 or fewer previously used items). Within each 
condition, those subjects who innovated believed that doing so was significantly easier 
than did those who borrowed (see Figure 10 below).135 
Figure 10. Mean perceived difficulty of innovating  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. Regression analysis of the three conditions with no other controls yields an R2 value 
of only 0.029, indicating that differences between the conditions explain very little of the 
overall variation in subjects’ decision making. See infra Appendix C, Regression 1. 
 135. All p’s < 0.05. 
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Logistic regression analysis of a full set of these data indicates that the strongest 
correlation with innovation was subjects’ beliefs about how easy it was to 
innovate.136 For every one-point increase (on a six-point scale) in how easy subjects 
thought it was to find a solution using two or fewer items from the other submission, 
they were 280.1% more likely to innovate.137 This is important for two reasons. First, 
it suggests, again, that our subjects were playing the game rationally and consistently 
with their perceptions of how easy it was to innovate. Second, it suggests that 
subjects’ perceptions of the ease of innovating were much more important than the 
objective ease of innovating when it came to their actual behavior. When deciding 
whether to innovate or borrow, subjective beliefs appear to be much more influential 
than the actual state of the world. That said, we cannot say that subjects’ perceptions 
about ease of innovating caused them to innovate or borrow. It is at least possible 
that subjects’ responses to our question about ease of innovation were driven by what 
they chose to do, rather than the other way around. 
That said, the strength of the correlation between the choice whether to innovate 
or borrow and perceived ease of innovation suggests to us that subjects are playing 
the game consistently with their subjective beliefs about the difficulties of 
innovating. For that reason, we do not wish to label their behavior “irrational.” But 
their strategies were not necessarily optimal.138 Consider the subjects in the 60% 
condition, where innovating was relatively easy and most subjects innovated. 
Those who did not innovate, approximately one-fifth of the group, scored much 
lower than did those who innovated (innovators mean score = 94.32; borrowers 
mean score = 85.40).139 Although the borrowers may have been playing 
consistently with their own beliefs, those beliefs may have led them astray.140 
Comparing these results to those of our previous experiments, it appears as though 
subjects’ innovation decisions are more sensitive to changes in the quality of existing 
solutions to a problem than they are to the costs of innovating or to information about 
the source of an existing solution. Whereas Experiments 1 and 2 showed small 
differences in innovation behavior despite large differences in cost, Experiment 3 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. See infra Appendix C, Regression 4.  
 137. See infra Appendix C, Regression 4.  
 138. Their behavior is consistent with what is often referred to as “bounded rationality.” 
See HERBERT A. SIMON, 1 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1982); Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, Rethinking Rationality, in 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 1, 4 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten 
eds., 2002) (“[M]odels of bounded rationality describe how a judgment or decision is reached 
(that is, the heuristic processes or proximal mechanisms) rather than merely the outcome of 
the decision . . . .”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003).  
 139. One-tailed t-test, p = 0.059. 
 140. The scores of the two groups in the other two conditions were much closer together. 
80% Condition: innovators = 90.58; borrowers = 86.22 (p = 0.12). 100% Condition: innovators 
= 88.38; borrowers = 85.54 (p = 0.13). The success of the innovators in the 100% condition is 
also interesting. Here, even though innovating should have been a suboptimal strategy given 
the strength of the provided submission, innovators were still able to score at least as well as 
borrowers. Perhaps this suggests that some of these innovators were rationally choosing to 
innovate because, at least for them, it was more promising. Further research is necessary to 
understand this issue. 
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produced some significant differences in innovation with changes in the actual 
quality of the underlying solution. In none of these cases, however, is innovation 
behavior fully consistent with rational choice predictions: when innovation is costly 
or difficult many subjects still choose to innovate, and when innovation is cheap and 
easy some subjects still choose to borrow. This suggests that there may be strong 
individual differences or other unobserved variations affecting innovation behavior. 
Moreover, these innovation decisions often lead to suboptimal outcomes for 
significant portions of our subject pool. 
3. Experiment 4: Design 
To more fully understand the nature of creators’ decisions, we chose to run 
another experiment as a partial replication of our findings in Experiment 3. As above, 
we shifted from a mathematical creativity task to a verbal creativity task, using the 
Scrabble-style game described in Experiment 2. The game worked the same way that 
it did in Experiment 2. Subjects were given the same set of letters and point values 
and were instructed to create a list of words that maximized their value. They were 
paid $0.01 per point. 
Again, subjects were told that another subject had played the game before them 
and entered a list of words. If they borrowed two or fewer words from the other 
player’s list, they would receive an additional sixteen points. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of three separate conditions that varied in the quality of listed words. 
In one condition, the list scored 60% of the maximum score; in the second condition, 
it scored 80% of the maximum score; and in the third condition, it scored the 
maximum number of points possible.141  
Because the provided list covered an increasing percentage of the available 
innovation space across the conditions, we anticipated that subjects would be less 
willing to innovate for the same bonus in the 100% condition than they would in the 
60% and the 80% conditions.142 
After completing the game, subjects answered two comprehension questions and 
a series of follow up and demographic questions. 
4. Experiment 4: Results 
We recruited 372 subjects to participate in the study via AMT. As in the previous 
studies, subjects were paid $0.50 to participate, and they were capable of earning 
more money based on their performance. Of the original pool, 54 were automatically 
eliminated from the experiment for violating the rules and opening up a separate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. The word lists were as follows. 60% Condition: zap, aye, kea, pay, key, pea (60.2% 
of the maximum score). 80% Condition: zek, pay, zap, key, peak, yep (79.5% of the maximum 
score). 100% Condition: zek, peaky, zap, zep, kype, zea (100%, the maximum score). 
 142. In fact, the innovation space is effectively zero in the 100% condition. As opposed to 
Experiment 3 (see supra footnote 132), only one 100% solution existed in Experiment 4. That 
solution scored the maximum of 415 points. If a subject decided to innovate in this condition 
(i.e., borrow only up to two words from the given solution), the best solution he could produce 
would score 350 points and 16 bonus points (for borrowing). As a result, subjects in the 100% 
condition are always better off borrowing than innovating. 
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Internet browser window during the creativity game. Of the remaining subjects, two 
subjects who did not speak English as their primary language were cut, as were 43 
subjects who failed one of the comprehension questions or the attention check. This 
left 273 subjects, of whom 46.9% were female, in the final pool. 
Between the 60% and 80% conditions, our results look like what we would expect 
based on Experiment 3. In the 60% condition, 46.81% of subjects innovated a word 
list that borrowed two or fewer words, while in the 80% condition, only 40.91% 
innovated. This is consistent with a rational approach to playing the game. When the 
innovation space shrinks, creators should be more willing to borrow from the existing 
IP rights. 
Table 8. Percentage innovating per condition 
 60% 80% 100% 
Percentage (%) innovating 46.81 
(a)(b) 
40.91 
(a)(c) 
85.71 
(b)(c) 
(a) 60% vs. 80% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.426. 
(b) 60% vs. 100% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.000. 
(c) 80% vs. 100% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.000. 
A strange thing happened in the 100% condition, however. Here, although 
innovating a solution that would score better than the existing solution was 
impossible, 85.7% of subjects chose to innovate rather than borrow. Not only did the 
percentage of innovators fail to decrease as expected, it actually doubled in size 
compared to the 80% condition.  
We believe that the oddness of these results was caused by subjects’ response to 
the words in the other player’s submission. In the 100% condition, the word list 
included words that would not have been familiar to many subjects (zek, peaky, zap, 
zep, kype, zea). Coming up with words that did not borrow from this list was 
comparably easy, since many of the more familiar words (for example, peak, pea, 
key, pay) were still available. When subjects began to contemplate whether to 
innovate or borrow, they likely assessed how easily they could come up with words 
that did not borrow from the existing solution. Because this was relatively easy in 
the 100% condition compared to the 60% and 80% conditions, subjects probably 
concluded that innovating was the optimal strategy. In doing so, however, they 
ignored the relative value of the words that were in the existing solution compared 
to the value of the words that they were creating. 
The failure of this strategy is starkly apparent in the scores of innovators and 
borrowers in each of the conditions. In each of the conditions, borrowers scored 
significantly more points than innovators.  
Table 9. Mean scores of innovators vs. borrowers by condition 
 60% 80% 100% 
Innovators 223.86 216.67*** 263.59*** 
Borrowers 248.20 287.50*** 390.00*** 
Note: The stars indicate that the mean scores of innovators and borrowers within a particular 
condition differ significantly. *** p < 0.01. The other comparison is nonsignificant. 
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But in the 100% condition, borrowers scored more than 100 points higher than 
innovators (390.0 versus 263.50). This represents a huge loss in welfare for the 
participants, and by proxy, for society.143 These innovators faced a perfect solution 
already available to them and chose to create new ones anyway. 
When we analyze our follow-up and demographic data, we again see that 
subjects’ estimates of the ease of innovating a solution were the strongest predictor 
of innovation behavior.144  
Figure 11. Mean perceived difficulty of innovating  
 
This suggests that subjects were once again playing according to their own sense 
of what was rational to do. And, once more, we failed to find any significant effects 
of age, gender, education, risk, language ability, or previous experience with 
Scrabble. When we examine the personality data, we did, this time, detect a 
significant although not very strong relationship between the personality factor of 
openness to new experience and innovation.145 The significance disappears, 
however, when other variables are considered in the regression, so we are hesitant to 
put substantial weight on it. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. Again, if creators receive positive welfare from innovating versus borrowing, it could 
offset the magnitude of these estimates. See supra note 102. There is, however, no reason to 
think that subjects in the 100% condition would value innovating so much more than would 
subjects in the other conditions. Presumably, whatever benefit subjects receive from 
innovating should be fairly consistent across conditions, so while it might make sense for some 
creators to take less money to innovate than they would receive to borrow, they should not 
presumably be willing to take so much less money in the 100% condition as they appear to. 
 144. See infra Appendix E. 
 145. See infra Appendix E. 
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The results of Experiment 4 shed interesting light on our findings from 
Experiment 3. In both cases, we found some evidence of subjects responding 
rationally to changes in the scope of the innovation space. But, rather than engage in 
the complex comparison of the relative values of the innovating and borrowing 
solutions, subjects seem to have relied on a heuristic assessment of ease of 
innovating. For the most part, this was a wise choice. It was no longer the wise 
strategy, however, for the 100% condition of Experiment 4. There, subjects could 
easily generate a list of words that did not borrow from the given solution. In 
choosing to innovate at such high rates, however, they ignored the value of their own 
words compared to the words in the given solution. Although innovating was easy, 
it was not smart. In this case the heuristic led them astray.  
III. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Regulating sequential innovation is perhaps the most important challenge IP law 
faces. In one sense, all IP doctrine and theory come down to the fundamental issue 
of balancing incentives for initial creators and opportunities for subsequent creators. 
In order to determine how to do so efficiently, the law needs an accurate 
understanding of how people make decisions about innovating and borrowing. More 
research needs to be done in this area, but our findings have interesting implications 
for IP law and policy. We will break them out into four separate sections. First, we 
will discuss the implications of our findings for the efficiency of innovation markets. 
We will then consider how (and how well) IP law affects creators’ incentives. Then, 
we will address issues associated with the production and acquisition of creativity. 
Finally, we will discuss some limitations to our study design and future research that 
we plan to undertake. 
Before we discuss the implications of our findings for IP law, we should keep two 
important points in mind. First, when we think about “creativity,” we tend to think 
about the kinds of ideas that represent substantial advancements from existing 
knowledge: Edison and the light bulb, Picasso and cubism, Perry and “Firework.” 
This kind of pioneering creativity is obviously important; it is the source of Nobel 
prizes and MacArthur genius grants. Yet despite all of the attention that it receives, 
it represents a relatively small percentage of human creative endeavor.146 At least as 
important are the innumerable tinkerers and tweakers whose only goal is to refine 
and adapt existing ideas.147 Quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, this kind of 
creativity is responsible for at least as much scientific and artistic progress as the 
pioneering kind. For every Edison, Picasso, and Perry, there are dozens, hundreds, 
or thousands of others who have continued to develop, interpret, and repurpose their 
ideas.148  
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. See RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 108, at 132–33. 
 147. Eric von Hippel has done important research on the social value of user innovation 
which often takes the form of tweaking existing products for new uses. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, 
DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); Joachim Henkel & Eric von Hippel, Welfare 
Implications of User Innovation, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EDWIN MANSFIELD 45 (Albert N. 
Link & F.M. Scherer eds., 2005). 
 148. Consider, for example, the large and growing arena of fan fiction. Fans write their 
own stories using existing (often copyrighted) characters, placing them in new settings or 
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 Second, when we think about innovation we tend to ascribe to it a positive 
normative valence. But as Kitch pointed out, sometimes innovation is costly and 
wasteful.149 If one drug successfully treats a disease, the addition of a second or third 
drug to treat the same disease may not be that valuable, especially compared to the 
use of those resources elsewhere.150 Innovation races and inventing around patents 
often lead to duplicative expenses without actual improvements in idea quality.151 
Our creativity games allow for this. Subjects might choose to innovate rather than 
borrow, but their innovation does not necessarily produce a higher score. IP and 
innovation scholars need to be clear about when innovation is valuable and when it 
is costly. 
A. The Efficiency of IP Markets 
Similar to other areas of the law, the fundamental structure of U.S. IP law is 
premised on the assumption that the people affected by it—creators, owners, and 
users—are rational. In this sense, rationality means seeking to maximize one’s 
welfare by comparing the costs and benefits of decisions and acting consistently with 
that calculus.152 Rationality does not mean that people don’t make mistakes, only that 
those mistakes will tend to be randomly distributed over time or in a society. If a 
person overestimates the costs of an action this time, he is likely to underestimate 
those costs the next time, and may improve his estimates in the long term.153 Or if a 
market participant always overestimates the costs of an action, another market 
participant will always underestimate them.154 In markets where there are both 
                                                                                                                 
 
changing other aspects of their identities and relationships. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi 
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 149. Kitch, supra note 43, at 278–79. 
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competition will occur inevitably once the patents expire. 
 151. For a discussion of these issues see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent 
Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803, 817–18 (2007). 
 152. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (2000) 
(“[T]he basic requirement of expected utility theory is that decision makers conduct an explicit 
or implicit cost-benefit analysis of competing options and select the optimal method of 
achieving their goals . . . .”). 
 153. See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market 
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 114–18 (2006) [hereinafter Epstein, Behavioral 
Economics]; Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 803, 810–14 (2008); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual 
Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 219–21 (2006); Alan Schwartz, How 
Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 143 n.17 (2008). 
 154. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18–19 (9th ed. 2014) (“The 
fact that people do not always make rational choices does not invalidate rational choice theory; 
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rational and biased actors, marginal buyers and sellers who determine equilibrium 
prices in the aggregate will often be rational individuals. Their rational behavior can 
wield sufficient influence to lead to an efficient market, from which biased 
individuals can also profit.155 Over time and on balance, learning and imitation 
strategies lead rational actors engaged in market transactions to converge toward 
optimal behavior.  
In an ideal world, in which people act rationally and there are no transaction costs, 
innovation markets should function efficiently to direct resources to their highest 
value uses.156 As we described in Part I, rational follow-on creators will weigh the 
costs and benefits of innovating and borrowing and select the optimal approach.157 If 
the owner of the underlying IP right insists on too high of a price to license it, the 
rational creator will innovate; or if the scope of the remaining innovation space is 
exceedingly narrow, the downstream creator will be willing to pay more to borrow 
from existing ideas. In this ideal world, the role of the IP system is simply to establish 
clear rights and allow people to transact. Social welfare is optimized by individuals 
rationally pursuing their private good.158 
Our experiments examine how people choose between innovating and borrowing. 
The hypothesis that undergirds IP law is that the choice can be shaped by external 
incentives. But the subjects in our experiments were, at best, mildly responsive to 
external incentives. Choices between innovation and borrowing correlated much 
more powerfully with their internal, subjective beliefs about the difficulty of 
innovating than with the optimal balance of costs and benefits. Our findings in these 
experiments suggest that markets for innovation may be less efficient than standard 
economic analysis assumes. Moreover, these inefficiencies may produce significant 
social costs. Although our data are far from conclusive, they are consistent with a 
growing body of research noting similar departures from rationality in other aspects 
of innovation, which raise the possibility of inefficiencies inhering in those aspects 
as well.159  
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 159. See Brüeggeman et al., supra note 5, at 14 (finding that property rules lead to 
inefficient distributions of creative goods compared to liability rules); Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, supra note 68, at 42 (finding that creators’ optimism about 
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The results of our experiments indicate that many of our subjects were making 
suboptimal innovate/borrow decisions, at least in the sense of reducing their 
payoffs,160 and that these decisions had significant effects on the total “welfare” 
produced in the games. For example, in the +1 condition of Experiment 1, where the 
rational choice was borrowing, more than half of our subjects innovated, and in the 
+72 condition, where the rational choice was innovating, almost a third of our 
subjects borrowed. Implicitly, this means that the least amount of money that these 
subjects were willing to accept to innovate was significantly skewed from what 
rational choice would predict. This seems to be due primarily to the overoptimism of 
the first group and the “underoptimism” of the latter about how easy it would be to 
create a noninfringing solution. The setup of our experimental task even allowed us 
to provide a rough estimate of the social welfare losses accrued due to these 
deviations from rational behavior.161  
Experiment 4 demonstrates very clearly one way in which creators’ decisions may 
fail to conform to welfare-maximizing expectations. Decisions about creating are 
complex, and when faced with complex decisions, people often substitute easy 
questions for harder ones.162 They use what we call innovation heuristics. Sometimes 
this works well, but as our experiment showed, sometimes it fails miserably. Many 
subjects in the 100% condition thought it was easy to come up with new words, but 
they neglected to consider how valuable the available words were. Accordingly, they 
made substantially less money in the game than did those who chose to borrow from 
the existing solution. 
To appreciate how these heuristics might affect a real IP transaction, consider a 
situation in which a research scientist is trying to develop a gene therapy treatment 
for a disease. She knows that another inventor owns a patent on a technology that 
relates to her work and that the inventor is willing to license it for a small fee. Our 
scientist, however, is exceedingly confident that she can work around the existing 
patent and avoid paying the fee. She can see an available method that might not 
infringe the existing patent. As it turns out, however, her confidence is misplaced. 
The new method, while easy to achieve, is not very successful, and the amount of 
resources she spends trying to avoid the patent dwarfs what she would have paid to 
license it. Although the market for the rights should have resulted in their efficient 
transfer, the scientist’s overconfidence produces an inefficient outcome.163  
Now consider how this situation interacts with how initial innovators are likely to 
price access to their ideas. As we have demonstrated in previous empirical research, 
creators tend to overvalue their creations because they overestimate their quality and 
likelihood of market success.164 We call this the “creativity effect.” If the inventor 
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 160. Maximizing their payoffs in the game is not the only motivation that subjects could 
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 161. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 162. KAHNEMAN, supra note 79. 
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 164. Buccafusco & Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, supra note 68, at 42. 
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owning the relevant patent in the above example suffers from a similar phenomenon, 
the inventor is likely to charge a higher price for borrowing the patent than 
appropriate, because the inventor is overoptimistic about the patent’s quality. This 
will further drive a wedge between the lowest amount of money that the inventor is 
willing to accept to license the patent and the highest amount of money that the 
overoptimistic scientist is willing to pay. If overoptimistic improvers consistently 
meet up with overoptimistic initial creators, we would expect to see suboptimal 
levels of IP transactions relative to rational choice expectations. 
The opposite will be true for underoptimistic improvers like those who borrowed 
in the +72 condition of Experiment 1. These subjects demonstrate a high implicit 
willingness to pay to borrow. But while this might lead to higher levels of IP 
transactions, it will not necessarily lead to optimal levels. Recall that these subjects 
are borrowing when there were strong incentives to innovate. In a real world scenario 
like the one described above, an insufficiently optimistic scientist would tend to 
overpay for the patent license when it could be easily invented around. The excessive 
licensing costs would then get passed along to consumers of any resulting 
discoveries, thereby increasing product prices and decreasing the number of 
consumers who can benefit from the discovery. 
As we explained above, the assumption of rationality in rational choice theory 
does not entail perfect behavior. Mistakes are inevitable, and, with enough chances, 
things could simply balance out. However, there are reasons to be skeptical that 
learning strategies and market forces are sufficient to overcome the effects of 
heuristics. On a general level, individuals who are subject to behavioral biases are 
often unable to overcome these biases even with training. Many behavioral biases 
are systematic and robust against learning.165 Just telling an inventor that he may be 
too overoptimistic with regard to the prospects of his own invention will not 
necessarily reduce his overoptimism. Furthermore, in innovation markets, invented 
products and processes are often hard to compare. This impedes the ability of 
overoptimistic inventors to imitate and learn from more rational competitors.166 
Finally, the market may not be able to compensate for all mistakes and biases creators 
make and suffer from.167 
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To the extent that we are correct, this suggests that economic predictions about 
the efficiency of innovation markets could be too optimistic. In real-world situations 
in which borrowing is optimal, we will tend to see excessive investment in innovation 
because downstream creators overestimate how easy it will be to invent around 
existing ideas. Conversely, in situations in which innovating is optimal, we will tend 
to see excessive borrowing for the opposite reason. Market signals that we would 
rely upon to correct poorly-chosen innovation or borrowing may be insufficient to 
move people dug in to one strategy or the other—as did even very large bonuses in 
our Experiments 1 and 2. Accordingly, innovation markets are unlikely to run 
smoothly in the absence of intervention. IP laws may have more to do than 
establishing rights and letting the system work its way out. 
B. IP Doctrine, Optimism, and Tastes for Innovation  
IP law solves market failures by molding people’s behavior. By providing 
incentives for some activities and by making other activities more costly, IP doctrines 
attempt to affect how people act. But if it is going to accomplish its goal of optimizing 
creative production, IP law must accurately assess how people respond to the positive 
and negative incentives that it creates. This assessment should not only focus on the 
incentives IP law creates to innovate. It should also take into account how IP law 
affects incentives to license existing innovations, which we have referred to in this 
Article under the term “borrowing.” 
As we explained at the beginning of this Article, copyright and patent laws must 
balance the incentives of initial creators with those of subsequent creators. They 
mostly do this through sequential innovation doctrines like the derivative works right 
and the doctrine of equivalents. These doctrines affect the scope of rights that are 
given to initial creators and the scope of the innovation space that is preserved for 
subsequent creators. By affecting the objective characteristics of the scope of 
innovation spaces, IP doctrines attempt to alter the economic values associated with 
different courses of conduct and, thus, the conduct that people choose to engage in.  
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Our research suggests that people’s decisions about whether to engage in 
innovating or borrowing are not motivated solely by objective factors about 
innovation environments. Rather, subjective factors including degrees of optimism 
play important roles in people’s choices. In addition, specific features of an 
innovation environment can manipulate creators’ behavior when creators rely on 
heuristics that are not well-suited to the task. Ultimately, these findings seriously 
complicate the law’s ability to channel creators’ conduct. By manipulating the costs 
and benefits of innovation behaviors, IP law attempts to encourage people to act in 
socially optimal ways. These experiments suggest that the law’s carrots and sticks 
may have to be substantially larger than previously realized in order to marginally 
influence creators’ behavior.  
This insensitivity to incentives may be less of a problem if there will be 
opportunities for sorting, such that people with strong preferences either way will 
find appropriate creative opportunities consistent with their preferences. This may be 
possible, but whether it is depends on the structure of IP doctrines. IP law affects the 
extent to which switching between innovating and borrowing is feasible. In 
particular, while patent law establishes a relatively level playing field between initial 
creators and downstream creators, copyright law strongly favors initial creators in a 
way that curtails downstream creators’ ability to borrow. As we described above,168 
patent law is generally more solicitous of borrowers than copyright law is. Patent law 
allows inventors who make novel and nonobvious contributions to existing 
inventions to obtain their own patents without obtaining a license, while copyright 
law’s derivative works rule generally prohibits borrowers from engaging in 
sequential creativity without first obtaining a license.  
If a guitar designer wants to design and craft a guitar in the shape of Prince’s 
former unpronounceable (but copyrighted) symbol, he cannot do so unless he obtains 
a license beforehand, and he will be subject to a copyright infringement lawsuit if he 
makes such a guitar.169 This is because copyright law, as interpreted currently by 
most courts, gives control of most tweaking innovations to the original innovator. 
This is the result in cases like Pickett v. Prince, in which Judge Posner ruled that a 
guitar that the defendant designed based on the unpronounceable symbol that Prince 
briefly took as his “name” was an infringement of copyright.170 Judge Posner ruled, 
moreover, that the defendant owned no part of his derivative work—even those parts 
which were not taken from Prince’s pre-existing work.171 Had the same activity 
occurred under the patent regime, however, the designer might have been able to 
obtain a patent that he could use to negotiate with Prince. In contrast to patent law, 
which creates rights in improvements and assigns them to the improver, copyright 
creates no such improver’s rights. All ownership of the right to make derivatives is 
concentrated in the pioneer.172 This means that minor innovations are relatively more 
expensive in copyright fields than they are in patent fields. 
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By making minor innovations more expensive, copyright law, in theory, affects 
sequential innovation in ways that patent law does not. First, among more-or-less 
rational creators, copyright law encourages them to engage in innovating rather than 
borrowing. Because creators are unable to obtain their own rights in their derivate 
creations, they will have less incentive to borrow from existing works. As the costs 
of borrowing rise, rational people will switch to innovating. Thus, instead of creating 
adaptions of existing superheroes, for example, people will create new ones.  
Our data suggest that some creators will not respond to this shift in incentives, 
because the additional incentives are inframarginal. For creators who are deeply 
committed to borrowing, the additional incentive will not be enough to overcome 
their aversion to innovating. Our experiments suggest that some creators have strong 
individual preferences for borrowing, either due to innovation heuristics or 
insufficient optimism about their own creative ability. In addition, they may receive 
intrinsic value from tweaking existing ideas that exceeds whatever the market value 
of the innovation may produce.173 For example, someone may enjoy manipulating 
sound recordings but have no interest in producing new ones. Because copyright law 
casts this behavior as infringement (and thus potentially subject to substantial 
statutory damages) and because the market value of the new work will often be small, 
the would-be borrower will likely forego the exercise entirely.174  
While patent law provides downstream creators with options for both innovating 
and borrowing, copyright law largely forecloses opportunities for borrowing, at least 
without a prior licensing arrangement. In so doing, copyright law further distorts 
creators’ behavior in ways that are likely to produce inefficiencies. Although 
copyright law may encourage more innovating by discouraging borrowing, this is 
not necessarily valuable innovation. In many cases, it will be duplicative and 
wasteful. As we have noted, the cumulative value of borrowing may actually be much 
greater than that of innovating, but because the value of any individual tweak is 
small, borrowing will be especially sensitive to the additional transaction costs that 
copyright law’s prelicensing requirement produces.  
Whether this variation in the treatment of sequential innovation between patent 
and copyright is warranted is a question for IP theory and further empirical research. 
As we noted at the outset, the answer depends on one’s assumptions about the costs 
and direction of investment in research and the desirability of few or many solutions 
to a given problem. On one hand, copyright law’s push toward innovating may 
produce greater social welfare if we believe that the kinds of issues that artists face 
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are best approached from a variety of different perspectives. Perhaps, by encouraging 
artists to innovate, copyright law is pushing them to view problems with fresh eyes 
and new insight.175 On the other hand, we might think that when artistic creativity is 
involved, people do not value too much novelty, instead preferring reinterpretations 
of familiar themes.176 This is in contrast to technological creativity where people 
value maximal novelty.177 If this is the case, then copyright law is hindering exactly 
the kind of creative expression that people want most.  
We are not in a position to justify or refute one of these normative assertions. We 
raise them to illustrate the potential practical importance of our findings and their 
relevance to IP policy. If copyright law’s emphasis on innovating over borrowing is 
socially costly, there is a readily available alternative that is derived from patent law. 
The law could reject Judge Posner’s interpretation and allow borrowers to obtain 
“blocking copyrights” in their new contributions.178 This would level the playing 
field between initial creators and downstream creators and balance out the incentives 
that downstream creators face for innovating and borrowing.179 
C. Addressing the Limitations of This Research 
The laboratory experiments reported here allow us to test fundamental 
assumptions about people’s behavior in novel ways. Random assignment of subjects 
to different conditions allows us to investigate causal relationships between factors 
that are not easily measured in other kinds of empirical studies.180 As always, though, 
these advantages come with certain costs. Aspects of our experimental design 
produce unavoidable limitations in the strength and generalizability of our findings. 
We have discussed many of these at length in a previous paper and will only briefly 
mention them here.181 
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A first set of limitations relates to our subject population. We recruited subjects 
from AMT rather than using real creators and innovators.182 We did this primarily 
for purposes of ease and cost reduction. Running these experiments with similar 
numbers of real-life creators would have been enormously more expensive. 
Nonetheless, these samples could differ in important ways, including in terms of 
intrinsic motivation, skill, and demographic characteristics. Moreover, unlike our 
sample of individually acting subjects, many creators work as part of firms.183 
Perhaps aspects of firm relations alter the individual effects that we see here. While 
we look forward to running similar experiments with more realistic samples in the 
future, we also want to note the extent to which creativity and innovation are 
increasingly mass phenomena.184 
A second set of limitations involves the creativity tasks that we employed. 
Although the wagon game involved aspects of creativity associated with algorithmic 
and heuristic thinking, it obviously differs in many ways from filming a movie or 
designing a smartphone. And while the Scrabble task may be closer to artistic 
creativity, it obviously still does not cover the entire creative process of a Picasso 
painting. Perhaps our results would have been different if we had used more 
open-ended creativity tasks or if the games had involved slower cognition. It is 
certainly possible, although it is difficult for us to predict how these changes would 
likely affect our results.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps more than any other area of the law, IP is grounded in the idea that legal 
doctrines can affect people’s behavior in socially beneficial ways. In order to 
succeed, however, the law needs an accurate account of human motivation. The 
four experiments reported in this Article shed new light on the central issue of IP 
law—how best to regulate sequential innovation. More research like this is 
essential if IP law is going to give up its reliance on untested assumptions and 
adopt a behaviorally realistic view of human motivation.  
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENT 1: WAGON BONUS 
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. When the coefficient is greater than 1.0, 
this indicates a positive relationship between that variable and innovating. When it 
is less than 1.0, there is a negative relationship. Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no 
directional relationship. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard error. 
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow) 
p < 0.01 - *** 
p < 0.05 - ** 
p < 0.10 - * 
Variable Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
Bonus condition 1.002 
(0.004) 
— — — — 
Ease of solving — 0.589*** 
(0.151) 
— 0.594*** 
(0.156) 
0.566*** 
(0.163) 
Ease of innovating — 3.726*** 
(0.150) 
— 3.866*** 
(0.156) 
3.704*** 
(0.155) 
Risk seeking — 0.972 
(0.076) 
— — — 
Openness — — 1.329** 
(0.119) 
1.231 
(0.136) 
1.156 
(0.138) 
Extroversion — — 0.858 
(0.108) 
0.751** 
(0.127) 
0.853 
(0.110) 
Conscientiousness — — 0.878 
(0.141) 
0.853 
(0.160) 
— 
Agreeableness — — 1.130 
(0.137) 
1.262 
(0.156) 
— 
Neuroticism — — 0.852 
(0.122) 
0.771* 
(0.141) 
— 
Age — — 1.018* 
(0.011) 
— 1.014 
(0.012) 
Gender — — 0.993 
(0.224) 
— 0.992 
(0.254) 
Constant 1.993*** 
(0.160) 
0.412 
(0.564) 
0.909 
(1.320) 
0.554 
(1.477) 
0.517 
(1.110) 
Did not understand 
instructions 
— — — — 0.604** 
(0.110) 
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 
R2 0.00067 0.237 0.028 0.254 0.253 
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENT: WAGON SOURCES  
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. The default condition is Previous AMT 
Player. When the coefficient is greater than 1.0, this indicates a positive relationship 
between that variable and innovating. When it is less than 1.0, there is a negative 
relationship. Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no directional relationship. Numbers 
in parentheses indicate standard error. 
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow) 
p < 0.01 - *** 
p < 0.05 - ** 
p < 0.10 - * 
Variable Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 
MIT Student 1.542 
(0.355) 
1.643 
(0.347) 
1.389 
(0.400) 
1.349 
(0.411) 
Computer 
Generated 
0.922 
(0.340) 
0.938 
(0.347) 
0.834 
(0.376) 
0.837 
(0.390) 
Age — 1.025 
(0.017) 
— 1.047** 
(0.020) 
Gender — 1.646 
(0.314) 
— 1.636 
(0.351) 
Risk seeking — 0.963 
(0.094) 
— — 
Perceived quality of 
solution 
— — 0.976** 
(0.011) 
0.973** 
(0.012) 
Ease of solving — — 0.481*** 
(0.202) 
0.486*** 
(0.206) 
Ease of innovating — — 2.447*** 
(0.188) 
2.651*** 
(0.197) 
Did not understand 
instructions 
— — 0.524** 
(0.273) 
0.471*** 
(0.283) 
Constant 1.483 
(0.240) 
0.415 
(0.742) 
24.856*** 
(1.208) 
3.810 
(1.425) 
Observations 212 212 212 212 
R2 0.011 0.037 0.189 0.225 
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT 2: SCRABBLE BONUS  
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. When the coefficient is greater than 1.0, 
this indicates a positive relationship between that variable and innovating. When it 
is less than 1.0, there is a negative relationship. Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no 
directional relationship. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard error. 
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow) 
p < 0.01 - *** 
p < 0.05 - ** 
p < 0.10 - * 
Variable Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
Bonus variable 1.012*** 
(0.004) 
— 1.013*** 
(0.004) 
1.013*** 
(0.004) 
1.012*** 
(0.004) 
Ease of solving 0.504*** 
(0.138) 
— 0.508*** 
(0.138) 
0.519*** 
(0.135) 
0.515*** 
(0.135) 
Ease of innovating 3.910*** 
(0.135) 
— 3.903*** 
(0.135) 
3.882*** 
(0.133) 
3.889*** 
(0.133) 
Openness — 1.002 
(0.010) 
0.996 
(0.012) 
0.997 
(0.012) 
— 
Extraversion — 1.009 
(0.008) 
1.000 
(0.011) 
1.000 
(0.010) 
— 
Conscientiousness — 1.004 
(0.010) 
0.998 
(0.012) 
0.997 
(0.012) 
— 
Agreeableness — 1.015 
(0.012) 
1.016 
(0.015) 
1.014 
(0.014) 
— 
Neuroticism — 1.003 
(0.009) 
0.993 
(0.011) 
0.996 
(0.010) 
— 
Age 0.991 
(0.011) 
— 0.989 
(0.011) 
— — 
Education 1.020 
(0.077) 
— 1.025 
(0.078) 
— — 
Gender 0.851 
(0.217) 
— 0.840 
(0.227) 
— — 
Risk seeking 1.056 
(0.075) 
— 1.052 
(0.082) 
— — 
Confidence in 
verbal/language ability 
1.037 
(0.147) 
— 1.029 
(0.151) 
— — 
How often do you play 
Scrabble 
1.109 
(0.099) 
— 1.114 
(0.099) 
— — 
Motivation to score 
well 
0.926 
(0.161) 
— 0.894 
(0.166) 
— — 
How well did you 
understand instructions 
1.261 
(0.243) 
— 1.323 
(0.250) 
— — 
Constant 0.144** 
(0.964) 
0.177* 
(0.969) 
0.124 
(1.605) 
0.138 
(1.236) 
0.194*** 
(0.387) 
Observations 541 541 541 541 541 
R2 0.293 0.008 0.296 0.290 0.288 
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENT 3: WAGON QUALITY  
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. The default condition is 60% Strength. 
When the coefficient is greater than 1.0, this indicates a positive relationship between 
that variable and innovating. When it is less than 1.0, there is a negative relationship. 
Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no directional relationship. Numbers in parentheses 
indicate standard error. 
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow) 
p < 0.01 - *** 
p < 0.05 - ** 
p < 0.10 - * 
Variable Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 
80% condition 0.574 
(0.376) 
0.608 
(0.379) 
0.484* 
(0.412) 
0.516 
(0.416) 
100% condition 0.396*** 
(0.356) 
0.399** 
(0.360) 
0.581 
(0.398) 
0.600 
(0.399) 
Age — 0.999 
(0.014) 
— — 
Gender — 0.643 
(0.304) 
— 0.735 
(0.330) 
Risk preference — 1.015 
(0.093) 
— — 
Ease of solving — — 0.528*** 
(0.210) 
0.534*** 
(0.212) 
Ease of innovating — — 2.826*** 
(0.182) 
2.801*** 
(0.182) 
Constant 3.937*** 
(0.280) 
4.842** 
(0.747) 
1.793 
(0.632) 
2.064 
(0.651) 
Observations 241 241 241 241 
R2 0.029 0.040 0.192 0.195 
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 APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENT 4: SCRABBLE QUALITY  
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. The default condition is 60% Strength. 
When the coefficient is greater than 1.0, this indicates a positive relationship between 
that variable and innovating. When it is less than 1.0, there is a negative relationship. 
Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no directional relationship. Numbers in parentheses 
indicate standard error. 
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow) 
p < 0.01 - ***, p < 0.05 - **, p < 0.10 - * 
Variable Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
80% group 0.961 
(0.355) 
— — 0.982 
(0.344) 
— 
100% group 3.957*** 
(0.421) 
— 4.158*** 
(0.380) 
4.000*** 
(0.410) 
3.858*** 
(0.377) 
Ease of solving 0.711* 
(0.167) 
— 0.715** 
(0.170) 
0.693** 
(0.168) 
0.683** 
(0.312) 
Ease of innovating 2.784*** 
(0.167) 
— 2.790*** 
(0.165) 
2.756*** 
(0.164) 
2.751*** 
(0.164) 
Openness — 1.027** 
(0.013) 
— — 1.025 
(0.015) 
Extraversion — 1.003 
(0.012) 
— — — 
Conscientiousness — 0.993 
(0.017) 
— — — 
Agreeableness — 1.021 
(0.017) 
— — — 
Neuroticism — 1.000 
(0.013) 
— — — 
Age 1.013 
(0.014) 
— 1.014 
(0.014) 
— — 
Education 1.060 
(0.119) 
— — — — 
Gender 0.574 
(0.347) 
— 0.608 
(0.332) 
— 0.623 
(0.169) 
Risk Seeking 0.935 
(0.106) 
— — — — 
Confidence in 
verbal/language ability 
1.052 
(0.226) 
— — — — 
How often do you play 
Scrabble 
0.865 
(0.147) 
— 0.888 
(0.142) 
— — 
Motivation to score well 1.121 
(0.244) 
— — — — 
How well did you 
understand instructions 
1.100 
(0.339) 
— — — — 
Constant 0.147 
(1.424) 
0.132 
(1.429) 
0.232* 
(0.816) 
0.306** 
(0.547) 
0.082 
(0.979) 
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 
R2 0.333 0.033 0.331 0.326 0.332 
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APPENDIX F: AN EXPERIMENT 1 FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT 
One possibility is that the results of our first experiment are merely an artifact 
of the experimental design based on the subject’s perception of the source of the 
provided submission on which the subject is attempting to improve. In the real 
world, follow-on innovators receive more information about existing ideas than in 
our first experiment. They may know, for example, whether the original innovator 
was a very talented and bright individual. In such case, follow-on innovators may 
consider it harder to “invent around” an existing idea and therefore decide to 
borrow rather than innovate. We ran another experiment to test whether subjects’ 
decisions to innovate or borrow are influenced by the perceived quality of the 
original innovator.  
We used the same wagon-creativity task and experimental software program as 
the previous experiment. After going through the practice game, subjects were 
given the same instructions about the nature of the game and the distribution of 
points as in Experiment 1. Subjects were also told that they would receive an 
additional sixteen points if their submission did not use three or more of the items 
from the existing submission. In three conditions to which subjects were randomly 
assigned, subjects were given different information about who had created the 
existing submission. In the baseline condition, subjects were told that the existing 
submission was randomly generated by a computer. In the second condition, 
subjects were informed that the submission was entered by a participant in a 
previous version of this study run on AMT. In the third condition, subjects were 
told that the submission was entered by a participant in a previous version of this 
study that was run at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). For each 
condition, the provided submission was the same one that had been used in 
Experiment 1. Subjects then played the game, replied to comprehension questions, 
and answered a series of follow-up and demographic questions similar to those 
used in the previous experiment. 
 We recruited 303 subjects via AMT to participate in this follow-up 
experiment. As in Experiment 1, subjects were paid $0.50 for participating and 
$0.03 for each point they scored in the game. We excluded 73 subjects from the 
final data analysis for missing one or both of the comprehension questions or for 
missing an attention question. We also removed 18 subjects who went over the 
weight limit. This left us with 212 subjects. They remained equally distributed 
across the three conditions, had a mean age of 30.75, and 62.74% of them were 
male. 
Our results do not confirm expectations that a higher perceived quality of the 
original innovator should prompt subjects to innovate less and borrow more. A 
superficial look at the descriptive data seems to suggest otherwise: the percentage 
of subjects choosing to innovate increases rather than decreases when moving from 
a computer-generated original submission, to a submission generated by another 
subject, to a submission created by an MIT student. However, a comparison of the 
three samples reveals that they cannot be said to be statistically different with a 
sufficient level of confidence. 
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Table 10. Percentage innovating per condition 
 Computer-generated 
condition 
Other AMT subject 
condition 
MIT student 
condition 
Percentage (%) 
innovating 
57.75 
(a)(b) 
59.72 
(a)(c) 
69.57 
(b)(c) 
(a) Computer-generated versus other subject: two-tail t-test, p = 0.81. 
(b) Computer-generated versus MIT student: two-tail t-test, p = 0.15. 
(c) Other subject versus MIT student: two-tail t-test, p = 0.22. 
Again, subjects’ answers to follow-up questions reveal that the strongest predictor 
of their behavior was their perception of how easy it would be to innovate. The easier 
they thought it would be to innovate, the more likely they were to do so. See supra 
Appendix B, Regression 4. In addition, as subjects’ perception of the given solution’s 
increased, they increasingly decided to borrow. See supra Appendix B, Regression 
4. This conforms to rational expectations, as well, because the better they believe the 
given solution to be, the harder it will be to innovate.  
Finally, despite the very different identities of those who supposedly provided the 
solutions, our subjects did not differ in how strong they thought the given solution 
was between conditions. Whether they were told that the solution was randomly 
generated or submitted by an MIT student, subjects thought the solution was about 
the same quality. (The mean [standard deviation] of subjects’ perceived quality of 
the solution were as follows: Previous Participant: 72.28 [16.93]; MIT Student: 75.96 
[15.28]; Computer Generated: 75.92 [16.35]. Interestingly, these estimates are lower 
than the actual quality of the solution [90%], which could explain why subjects chose 
to innovate at such high rates. All differences are nonsignificant.) 
